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I. INTRODUCTION
ORPORATE lawyers now work in a world that has become tragi-
cally sensitized to executive greed and financial fraud and the
consequential damage to our capital markets. The reported cor-
porate accounting frauds during the past five years evidence an epidemic
of infectious financial fraud involving an overwhelming number of com-
panies, from the dot.coms to the blue chips. One writer has recently con-
cluded that the executives of "the vast majority of major corporations"
have been "artificially inflating their profits."1 He concluded, as many
others have, that extravagant executive stock options, a relatively recent
phenomenon in executive compensation, have provided corporate man-
agers with "a strong incentive to mislead investors about the true condi-
tion of their companies" by resorting to the exaggeration of corporate
revenues. 2 When more than half of America's top two hundred chief ex-
ecutive officers have mega-options with an average value of over $50 mil-
lion,3 it is obvious, as economist Michael Jensen has concluded, that
corporate managers facing internal financial difficulties will be heavily
penalized for telling the truth and outrageously rewarded for lying, and
that the resultant "unethical behavior [will be] extended to all sorts of
things."4 In a similar vein, a well-known accounting academic has stated
that the Lucent Technologies scandal taught him that blatantly improper
revenue recognition "could happen anywhere" and that "these blue chip
companies were just as susceptible to accounting trickery as the small
* H. Edward Harter Chair of Commercial Law, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law,
University of Louisville. This article reflects the author's research in connection with his
presentation at the Tenth Annual SMU Corporate Counsel Symposium held on November
1, 2002.
1. John Cassidy, The Greed Cycle, NEW YORKER, Sept. 23, 2002, at 64, 74. Similarly,
Rep. John LeFalce has recently stated that corporate earnings manipulation has become a
"common phenomenon." Richard Hill, LaFalce Takes Aim at Republican Bill, Calls Earn-
ings Manipulation "Common," 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 741 (May 6, 2002). See also
Ken Brown, Questioning the Books-Tweaking Results Is Hardly a Sometime Thing, Many
Firms, WALL Sr. J., Feb. 6, 2002, at Cl; Arthur Levitt, The Numbers Game, Remarks at
the N.Y.U. Center for Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998).
2. Cassidy, supra note 1, at 72; see also Gretchen Morgenson, Corporate Conduct:
News Analysis; Bush Failed to Stress Need to Rein in Stock Options, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
2002, at Cl.
3. Cassidy, supra note 1, at 77.
4. Id. at 75.
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ones." 5 Consequently, corporate counsel should reject any presumption
of regularity and stop feigning ignorance when confronted with informa-
tion that appears, at first blush, to raise accounting issues. All corporate
lawyers must familiarize themselves with the various deceptive practices
that have led to the downfall of so many publicly-held companies in the
last five years. Corporate counsel must understand the mechanisms used
in the past to distort corporate earnings in order to recognize the red flags
of potential distortion in the future.
During the last five years, earnings restatements by publicly-held com-
panies have increased dramatically. Long considered "a proxy for
fraud,"'6 these restatements have grown from only three in 1.9817 to over
two hundred last year.8 The federal government's first in-depth study of
earnings restatements, recently concluded by the U.S. General Account-
ing Office, found that earnings restatements had spiked 145%, from 92 in
1997 to 225 by June 30, 2002, a figure projected to increase to 170% by
year-end. 9 Moreover, companies restating their earnings had average
market capitalizations of over $2 billion, as compared to an average of
$500 million five years ago."' The study identified improper revenue rec-
ognition as the major cause for these restatements and for the largest
resultant decreases in stock prices. I I The resultant negative impact on
the market price of those restating companies' securities, before one even
considers the disastrous systemic effect on market prices generally, has
been well over $100 billion. 12 These restatements have led to civil and
criminal proceedings brought, respectively, by the U.S. Securities and Ex-
5. Id. at 74. See generally HOWARD M. SCHILIT, FINANCIAL SHENANIGANS (2d ed.
2002); Badly in Need of Repair, ECONOMIST, May 2, 2002, at 66. For an insightful discourse
on the endemic immorality of corporate management, the destructive impact of congres-
sional and judicial deregulation, and the monitoring failures of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the legal and accounting professions, see William S. Ler-
ach, Plundering America: How American Investors Got Taken for Trillions by Corporate
Insiders, The Rise of the New Corporate Kleptocracy, 8 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 69 (2002).
6. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57
Bus. LAw. 1403, 1407 (2002).
7. See lanthe Jeanne Dugan, Did You Hear the One About the Accountant? It's Not
Very Funny, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2002, at AI.
8. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL STATIMENT RESTATEMENTS:
TRENI). MARKET IMPACTIS, RiZGULA TORY RESPONSES, ANI) REMAINING CHALLENGES,
GAO-03-138 (Oct. 2002) [hereinafter GAO RESTATEMENis REPOIr]; see Richard Hill,
GAO Report Finds Restatements Rising; Revenue Recognition is Biggest Culprit, 34 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1771 (Oct. 28, 2002): see also Matt Krantz, More Earnings Restate-
ments on Way: Trend Growing, GAO Warns, USA TODAY, Oct. 25, 2002, at 3B. The SEC
Enforcement Director recently reported a huge spike in the SEC's financial reporting en-
forcement actions during 2002, rising to 149 actions from 112 in 2001 and 103 in 2000. See
Kip Betz, New Regulatory, Enforcement Landscape Discouraging Legal "Creativity," Cut-
ler Says, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1582 (Sept. 30, 2002).
9. GAO RESTATEMENTS REPORT, supra note 8, at 14.
10. Id. at 17.




change Commission (SEC) 13 and the U.S. Department of Justice,' 4 as
well as numerous and well-publicized class actions against these corpora-
tions and their officers, directors, accountants, and lawyers. 15 The corpo-
rate defendants are not only immature, overly ambitious start-ups, but
also are companies once considered among the all-stars of American cap-
italism, including Xerox, Enron, Global Crossing, WorldCom, Tyco,
Qwest Communications, and Rite Aid.16
13. See, e.g., SEC v. Vinson, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No.
1650 (Oct. 10, 2002); SEC v. Fastow, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release
No. 1640 (Oct. 2, 2002); SEC v. Dunlap, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Re-
lease No. 1623 (Sept. 4, 2002); SEC v. Kopper, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act
Release No. 1617 (Aug. 21, 2002); SEC v. Oxford Health Plans, Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Act Release No. 1601 (July 25, 2002); SEC v. Adelphia Communications
Corp., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 1599 (July 24, 2002); SEC
v. WorldCom, Inc., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 1585 (June 27,
2002); SEC v. Hill, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 1582 (June 21,
2002); SEC v. Xerox Corp., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 1542
(Apr. 11, 2002); SEC v. Schilling, 74 S.E.C. Docket 1064 (Feb. 28, 2001); see also Susan
Pulliam & Rebecca Blumenstein, SEC Broadens Its Investigation into Revenue-Boosting
Tricks, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2002, at Al.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, No. 02-CR 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); United States
v. Waksal, No. 02-MAG-1186 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); United States v. Ganley, No. CR-02-007
(N.D. Cal. 2002); United States v. Thatcher, No. CR-02-0028 (N.D. Cal. 2002); United
States v. Polishan, No. 3:96-CR-274 (M.D. Pa. 2002); United States v. Allan, No. CR 98-
40167 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Kip Betz, Former Adelphia Exec Pleads Guilty to Securi-
ties Fraud, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1860 (Nov. 18, 2002); John Herzfeld, Former
WorldCom Accountants Enter Guilty Pleas for Roles in Scheme, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1734 (Oct. 21, 2002); Jerry Markon, WorldCom's Yates Pleads Guilty, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 8, 2002, at A3; James Bandler, Xerox Faces Criminal Inquiry Tied to Financial Restate-
ment, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2002, at Al; Calif. Jury Convicts Former Executive Accused in
Scheme to Inflate Revenue, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1426 (Aug. 26, 2002); Joyce
Cutler, Former E-Mail Company Execs Named in Criminal, Civil Fraud Actions, 34 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 231 (Feb. 11, 2002); Former Leslie Fay CFO Gets Nine Years for
Role in Earnings Inflation Scheme, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 126 (Jan. 28, 2002).
15. See, e.g., P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Cendant Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 589
(D.N.J. 2001); In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (S.D. Fla. 2001); In re Peer-
less Sys. Corp. Sec. Litig., 182 F. Supp. 982 (S.D. Cal. 2002); In re SCB Computer Tech.,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 149 F. Supp. 2d 334 (W.D. Tenn. 2001); In re Ramp Networks, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 201 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2002); DSAM Global Value Fund v. Altris Software,
Inc., 288 F.3d 385 (9th Cir. 2002); Aldridge v. A.T. Cross Corp., 284 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2002);
In re Vantive Corp. Sec. Litig., 283 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2002); Greebel v. FTP Software,
Inc., 194 F.3d 185 (1st Cir. 1999); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542 (6th Cir.
1999); Chu v. Sabratek Corp., 100 F. Supp. 2d 815 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Bell v. Fore Sys., Inc.,
No. 97-1265, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7808 (W.D. Pa. May 25, 1999); Cooper v. Pickett, 137
F.3d 616 (9th Cir. 1997); In re Sys. Software Assoc., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 97 C 177, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3071 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2000); In re Northpoint Communications Group, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 221 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Sakhrani v. Brightpoint, Inc., No. IP 99-
870-C H/G, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5023 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2001); In re Secure Computing
Corp. Sec. Litig., 184 F. Supp. 2d 980 (N.D. Cal. 2001); In re Galileo Corp. Shareholders
Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D. Mass. 2001); In re Adaptive Broadband Sec. Litig., No. C 01-
1092 SC, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5887 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2002); Cheney v. Cyberguard
Corp., No. 98-6879-CIV, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16351 (S.D. Fla. July 31, 2001); In re Mile-
stone Scientific Sec. Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 425 (D.N.J. 2000); Yadlosky v. Thornton, 120 F.
Supp. 2d 622 (E.D. Mich. 2000); In re Livent, Inc. Sec. Litig., 148 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y.
2001); In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Sec. Litig., 151 F. Supp. 2d 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
16. See Alex Berenson, Tweaking Numbers to Meet Goals Comes Back to Haunt Exec-
utives, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2002, at Al (listing financial fraud investigations of Adelphia
Communications, Computer Associates, Dynergy, Enron, Global Crossings, Qwest, Rite
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These financial fraud scandals easily surpass in breadth and depth the
last cycle of corporate immorality revealed during the massive savings
and loan association failures of the 1980s. 17 While those failures prima-
rily involved major regulatory failures in a single industry, the present
scandals are systemic and generally involve a type of accounting fraud
that has been variously termed creative accounting, earnings management,
or improper revenue recognition.8 The improper revenue recognition
that has led to massively widespread overstatements of revenues has not
resulted from mathematical errors, misperceptions of complex accounting
principles, or good faith differences in judgment among reasonable ac-
countants. Instead, corporate officers, working with corporate account-
ants, have fraudulently reported material overstatements of revenue
based on contracts that were nonexistent, unperformed, or lacking eco-
nomic substance. These overstatements were deliberately perpetrated by
the use of deceptive schemes that corporate and securities lawyers would
refer to as manipulative devices and what virtually everyone else would
refer to as garden-variety fraud. These devices are just as flagrantly
fraudulent as the notorious frauds of the more distant past, exemplified
by Equity Funding's phony life insurance policies and fabricated death
certificates 19 and Glenn Turner's Ponzi schemes.2 1 The deceptive devices
currently in vogue are variously known as "roundtripping," "boomer-
Aid, Tyco International, WorldCom, and Xerox); WorldCom: Another Cowboy Bites the
Dust, ECONOMIST, June 29, 2002, at 57 (listing a "rogues' gallery" including Enron, Global
Crossing, Adelphia Communications, Peregrine Systems, Qwest Communications,
WorldCom, Dynergy, ImClone, and Tyco International). Earnings restatements have re-
sulted in shareholder derivative litigation that, during 2002 alone, has cost U.S. companies
more than $1 billion in settlement payments, creating a crisis in director and officer liability
insurance coverage. See Matthew J. Schlesinger, Insurance Coverage Important for Direc-
tors and Officers Who Are Facing SEC Investigations or Suits Alleging Securities Fraud, 17
CORP. COUNSEL WKLY. 328 (2002). Insurers increasingly resist coverage, seeking to re-
scind policies based on alleged misrepresentations in the application process. Id. They
claim that misleading financial statements submitted with applications constitute material
misrepresentations that void policies. ld.; see, e.g., Am. Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v.
Towers Fin. Corp., 1997 WL 906427 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1997) (holding that misrepresenta-
tion of financial condition in an application was material). In addition, insurers are invok-
ing dishonesty exclusions in policies, which are typically interpreted to permit denial of
coverage upon proof of intentional dishonest, fraudulent or criminal conduct. See, e.g.,
Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp. 836 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that dishonesty exclu-
sion requires intentional dishonest conduct); see also Jonathan D. Glater & Joseph B.
Treaster, Insurers Scale Back Corporate Liability Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2002, at BI.
17. See MICHAEL BINSTEIN & CHARLES BowDEN, TRusi ME: CHARLES KEATING
AND THE MISSING BILLIONS (1993); Carl Felsenfeld, Symposium: Financial Institutions and
Regulations, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration: The Savings and Loan Crisis, 59
FORDHAM L. REV. 7 (1991); Daniel B. Gail & Joseph J. Norton, A Decade's Journey From
"Deregulation" to "Supervisory Regulation ": The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 Bus. LAW. 1103 (1990).
18. See generally CHARLES W. MULFORD & EUGENE E. COMISKEY, THE FINANCIAL
NUMBERS GAME, DETECTING CREATIVE ACCOUNTING PRACTICES (2002); Ken Brown,
Creative Accounting: How to Buff a Company, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2002, at Cl.
19. See William Blundell, A Scandal Unfolds: Some Assets Missing, Insurance Called
Bogus At Equity Funding Life, WALL Sr. J., Apr. 2, 1973, at 1, col. 6; see also Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646 (1983).
20. See SEC v. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973); see also SEC v. Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
[Vol. 56
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angs," "buy-backs," "fictitious orders," "conditional contracts," "cookie
jar reserves," and "channel stuffing." These fraudulent practices clearly
fall as much or more within the legal domain than the field of public
accountancy. The fact that corporate officers are using these deceptive
devices to create false numbers does not permit corporate lawyers to la-
bel these frauds as accounting problems. The abatement of these sham
transactions and resultant disclosure failures is also corporate counsel's
responsibility.
Again, the questions raised by Judge Stanley Sporkin in Lincoln Sav-
ings & Loan Ass'n v. Wall are being asked:
Where were these professionals, a number of whom are now assert-
ing their rights under the Fifth Amendment, when these clearly im-
proper transactions were being consummated? Why didn't any of
them speak up or disassociate themselves from the transactions?
Where also were the outside accountants and attorneys when these
transactions were effectuated? 2
1
These questions are finally being answered. Congress, the SEC, the Jus-
tice Department, and class action securities lawyers have discovered that
these professionals were there all the time, participating in the manipula-
tion by structuring, negotiating, drafting, or rubber-stamping deceptive
schemes.
Accountants for publicly-held companies do not appreciate the conse-
quences. First, Arthur Andersen was indicted and convicted on felony
charges related to the creative accounting services it performed for En-
ron, an apparently fatal event for the accounting firm. 22 Second, and
most important, the entire accounting profession largely has forfeited its
time-honored, traditionally sanctified privilege of establishing its own ac-
counting and auditing principles and regulating itself.
2 3
Similarly, corporate lawyers do not appreciate the consequences.
Counsel for publicly-held companies have fought the SEC for years to
protect their traditional privileges to establish their own principles of pro-
fessional responsibility and to regulate themselves. They are now losing
that war.24 Corporate counsel, whether working in-house or externally,
21. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D:C. 1990).
22. See Andersen Fined $500,000, on Probation for Five Years in Enron Obstruction
Case, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1732 (Oct. 21. 2002); see also Cassell Bryan-Low, Who
Are the Winners at Andersen's Yard Sale?, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2002, at Ct.
23. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1.
24. The SEC has long sought to cast corporate lawyers in the role of undercover po-
licemen. See, e.g., SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 712-17 (D.D.C.
1978). Although the SEC has infrequently utilized its Rule of Practice 102(e), 17 C.F.R.
201.102(e), to suspend or bar professionals from practice before the SEC for improper
professional conduct, the SEC's Chairman has recently stated that if state bar associations
continue to ignore SEC referrals of ethical breaches by corporate lawyers, the SEC will
assume the disciplinary function. See Rachel McTague, Pitt Says SEC Will Take on Assign-
ment of Disciplining Lawyers if State Bars Do Not, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1529
(Sept. 23, 2002); see also Harvey L. Pitt, Remarks Before the Annual Meeting of the
American Bar Association's Business Law Section, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 12, 2002).
Corporate counsel's role in the collapse of Enron Corporation, or, at least, their failure to
2003]
SMU LAW REVIEW
have been spotlighted for their role in these financial reporting frauds. In
many cases, they have drafted or approved disclosure documents filed
with the SEC or press releases and other publicly-disseminated informa-
tion without fully disclosing their corporate clients' improper revenue
recognition practices. In addition, they have negotiated or approved con-
tracts, side agreements, and other documents that were used by corporate
insiders to artificially inflate revenues. In some cases, they may have
voiced objections to deceptive revenue recognition practices, but, never-
theless, acquiesced in the fraudulent conduct when their advice was not
followed.
The SEC has now been joined by Congress in decisive efforts to elevate
their standards of behavior. In the Public Company Accounting Reform
and Investor Protection Act of 2002, popularly known as the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act,25 Congress has ordered lawyers to tell corporate directors
about evidence of corporate fraud.26 It has authorized federal regulation
of corporate counsel and imposed a new federal duty to report evidence
of fraud and breaches of fiduciary duty to their corporate clients' highest
report to Enron's board of directors various transactions those counsel believed created
conflicts of interest, appears to have convinced the SEC and Congress that federal regula-
tion of lawyers was critically necessary. See Ellen Joan Pollack, Limited Partners: Lawyers
for Enron Faulted Its Deals, Didn't Force Issue, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2002, at Al. An
investigatory report done for Enron's board criticized its outside counsel for an absence of
"objective and critical professional advice." Id.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1.
26. Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the SEC, within 180 days from the
statute's July 30, 2002 enactment date, to adopt rules establishing minimum standards of
professional conduct for attorneys and to amend its disciplinary rules specifically to require
attorneys to report evidence of material violations of the securities laws, as well as breaches
of fiduciary duty and similar violations of state law by their corporate clients to the com-
pany's highest authorities, beginning with the company's chief legal counsel or chief execu-
tive officer, and, if appropriate action is not taken, to the company's audit committee,
independent directors or the board of directors as a whole. 15 U.S.C. § 7245. This con-
gressional mandate is considerably more stringent than the American Bar Association's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.13, which only requires lawyers who detect
violations to proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the company, and
only permitting lawyers to refer the violations to the company's highest authorities.
MODiE RULI-1S OF PROF'L CONDUCrT R. 1.13 (2002).
Section 602 of the Act authorizes the SEC to censure, suspend, or deny any person the
privilege of practicing before the SEC if that person is found not to possess the "requisite
qualifications to represent others," or to be "lacking in character or integrity, or to have
engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct," or to have willfully violated or
aided and abetted a violation of the securities laws. 15 U.S.C. § 78d-3. Congress has codi-
fied SEC Rule of Practice 102(e)(l) as a new Section 4 of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 (1934 Act). Id. According to former SEC General Counsel Daniel Goelzer, the
SEC could take the position that an entire law firm could be barred from SEC practice if
one of the firm's lawyers has violated the SEC's minimum standards of conduct. See Cor-
porations Need to Take Action Now Despite Uncertainties in Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 17 CORP.
COUNSEL WKLY. 273 (2002). He has stated firms could protect themselves against disbar-
ment by establishing and maintaining appropriate compliance programs. Id. See generally
C. Evan Stewart, Holding Lawyers Accountable in the Post-Enron Feeding Frenzy, 34 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1587 (Sept. 30, 2002); Stephen J. Crimmins, New U.S. Law Will
Require Attorneys to Report Evidence of Corporate Client's Violations, 8 WORLD SEC. L.
REP. 31 (2002); Richard W. Painter, Congress Tells Corporate Lawyers to Tell Directors
About Fraud, 6 WALL Si. LAW. 6 (2002); Richard B. Schmitt, Lawyers Pressed to Report
Fraud Under New Law, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2002, at Bi.
[Vol. 56
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authorities, including the corporations' audit committees and boards of
directors. This recently imposed duty to report evidence of fraud, en-
acted in an environment where most of the fraud has involved deceptive
revenue recognition, requires all corporate counsel to have at least the
competence of a sophomore accounting major. Without this minimum
familiarity with basic accounting principles, corporate lawyers would be
marginalized, unable to spot blatant evidence of financial fraud even
while standing in its midst. The principle that basic accounting knowl-
edge is integral to competency has long been recognized by corporate
counsel engaged in due diligence for public offerings, mergers, and acqui-
sitions.27 Corporate counsel can no longer feign ignorance of financial
fraud or simply abdicate their responsibilities to the accounting
profession.
In this article, I will address, generally, the question of how lawyers
must reposition themselves in their role as corporate advisors, not only to
improve their traditional services in ensuring full public disclosure and
compliance with other applicable laws, but also to fulfill their congressio-
nally imposed duties to inform their clients' general counsel, chief execu-
tive officers, audit committees, and boards of directors about evidence of
corporate fraud, including evidence of abusive revenue recognition prac-
tices. I will begin by focusing on our duty of competence and the intensi-
fying demands that we develop basic accounting skills in order to
competently perform our roles as corporate advisors. Many of the issues
corporate counsel confront require at least a rudimentary knowledge of
accounting principles, ranging from asset valuations in business forma-
tions and acquisitions to resolution of materiality issues in satisfying pub-
lic disclosure requirements.
After my discussion of corporate counsel's enhanced duty of compe-
tence, I will analyze the materiality doctrine and describe the necessarily
subordinate revenue recognition principles generally applied in connec-
tion with preparation of financial disclosures. As part of this discussion, I
will explain that our continuing financial crisis may result in large mea-
sure from the continuing failure of both the legal and accounting profes-
sions to focus on the radical differences in their respective definitions of
materiality. I will then describe the more commonly employed abusive
revenue recognition practices that have caused the vast majority of reve-
nue restatements in recent years.
Because improper revenue recognition has been at the core of many of
the current financial scandals and continues to be a major corporate lia-
bility risk, I believe the essential competence required of corporate law-
yers must include the ability to recognize the most common deceptive
27. For a general discussion of due diligence in the context of public offerings under
the Securities Act of 1933, see Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir.
1965). See also Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Primary Liability of Securities Lawyers,
50 SMU L. REV. 383 (1996).
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revenue recognition devices and the red flags28 that indicate the possibil-
ity of their occurrence. Corporate counsel must apply these rudimentary
skills for the benefit of their organizational clients not only through gen-
eral vigilance, but also through random due diligence investigations to
verify their clients' public disclosures. I will conclude that this enhance-
ment of our competence will not only serve the interests of our corporate
clients, but will also preserve what remains of the traditional role of the
legal profession in establishing its own principles and standards of profes-
sional conduct.
II. CORPORATE COUNSEL'S DUTY OF COMPETENCE
A. THE TRADITIONAL DUTY OF COMPETENCE
The American Bar Association (ABA) has traditionally set the ethical
rules for all lawyers, and, because these rules have been widely adopted
by the states' highest courts, they have established the floor upon which
standards for professional conduct have been built. The ABA's Model
Rules2 9 have been interpreted and, in many instances, amplified by the
formal ethics opinions issued by the ABA's Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility. 30 The standards of care applicable to corpo-
rate lawyers' conduct are derived, of course, from many other sources,
including the American Law Institute's (ALI) Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers, 3' the common law of torts,32 the SEC's administra-
28. "Red flags" have been described as those facts that come to the attention of a
professional that would place a reasonable professional on notice that the client company
or its officers or other employees are engaged in wrongdoing to the detriment of investors.
In re Sunterra Corp. Sec. Litig., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1333 (M.D. Fla. 2002). One's failure
to heed attention-grabbing red flags supports a reasonable inference of scienter in federal
securities fraud litigation. Id.; see also In re First Merchants Acceptance Corp. Sec. Litig.,
1998 WL 781118 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 1998).
29. MOoDEL RULES OF PROF'c CONDUCT (2002). The ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, adopted by most of the states' highest courts, serve generally as the foun-
dation of the corporate lawyer's standards of care. It is important to observe that these
rules establish only minimum standards of conduct.
30. The ABA has amplified its ethical principles for lawyers through the formal opin-
ions of its Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. Perhaps the most perti-
nent of these formal ethics opinions are Formal Opinions 335 and 346, which specifically
advised lawyers in unregistered securities transactions to fulfill their independent disclo-
sure obligations by detecting and disclosing material facts and to do so without blind reli-
ance on representations made by corporate representatives. ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 335 (1974); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsi-
bility, Formal Op. 346 (1982). In Formal Opinion 92-366, lawyers were advised that they
had a duty to repudiate any work product that they have reason to believe furthers future
fraudulent conduct and failure to do so would be construed as assisting the client's fraud.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992).
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000). The ALI's restate-
ment of the common law governing lawyers includes coverage at chapter four of lawyer
civil liability for professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duties and other remedies, as
well as vicarious liability and liability to non-clients. Id.
32. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977). Section 552(l)
provides:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false informa-
[Vol. 56
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tive and disciplinary proceedings, 33 and judicial opinions addressing the
responsibilities of corporate lawyers.3 4
Model Rule 1.1 establishes the lawyer's basic duty of competence. 35 It
provides: "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thorough-
ness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. '36
This duty readily subsumes all the other Model Rules because the broad
competency concept naturally requires conduct that comports with the
ethical standards of the legal profession. In fulfilling their duty of compe-
tence, corporate counsel must be especially mindful of their duty, under
Model Rule 1.2(d), not to assist their clients' fraudulent conduct: "A law-
yer shall not counsel a client... , or assist a client, in conduct that the
lawyer knows is . . . fraudulent. '37 Moreover, they must always act in
compliance with their own duty of honesty under Model Rule 8.4(c): "It
is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. '38
In order to fulfill their duty of competence, corporate counsel must
also comply with both their duty of candor under Model Rule 1.4 and
their duty of independence under Model Rule 2.1. Model Rule 1.4(b)
provides: "A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably neces-
sary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the repre-
sentation. '39 Model Rule 2.1 provides: "In representing a client, a lawyer
shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid ad-
vice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law, but other
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that
may be relevant to the client's situation. ' 40 The comment to Model Rule
2.1 explains that lawyers must provide their clients honest, straightfor-
ward advice, even if the advice involves "unpleasant facts and alternatives
tion for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to
liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon
the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in ob-
taining or communicating the information.
Section 552 reflects a common law substitution of a foreseeability standard for the earlier
requirement of privity of contract.
33. See, e.g., In re Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981); In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Exchange Act Release No.
15,982, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,124 (July 2, 1979); In re Fergu-
son, 5 S.E.C. Docket 37, S.E.C. Admin. Proc. File No. 3-4528 (Aug. 21, 1974); In re Fields,
Securities Act Release No. 5404, [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 79,407
(June 18, 1973).
34. See, e.g., Molecular Tech. Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1991); Breard
v. Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d
535 (2d Cir. 1973): SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968). See generally Warren, supra
note 27; James H. Cheek, Professional Responsibility and Self-Regulation of the Securities
Lawyer, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 597 (1975).
35. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002).
36. Id.
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002).
38. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2002).
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (2002).
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2002) (emphasis added).
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that a client may be disinclined to confront" or that will be "unpalatable"
to them.41 It further provides that lawyers have a duty to offer that ad-
vice, even when clients have proposed courses of action that are likely to
result in adverse legal consequences. 42
The foregoing rules collectively establish that the competence concept
is integrally related not only to lawyers' duties to maintain and apply the
requisite knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation in their engage-
ments, but also to their obligations to act with honesty, independence,
and candor in advising clients against all fraudulent or deceitful activities
and refusing to assist them should that conduct continue. 43 Although this
comprehensive duty of competence applies to all lawyers, it imposes par-
ticularly intense and difficult obligations on corporate lawyers who re-
present legally abstract corporate entities.
Model Rule 1.13 is emphatic in its insistence that corporate lawyers
recognize that they represent their corporate, organizational clients and
not the individual corporate directors, officers, or employees who may
have retained them on the corporations' behalf.44 The rule states, in ef-
fect, that if corporate counsel knows that a corporate officer or employee
intends to act in violation of legal obligations to the corporation, includ-
ing conduct that would be fraudulent or in breach of fiduciary duties,
corporate counsel must proceed "as is reasonably necessary in the best
interest of the organization," and are permitted to refer the matter up the
chain to the corporation's highest authority.45 Model Rule 1.13, by re-
quiring corporate counsel to favor the abstract, artificial corporate entity
over its corporate representatives, properly ignores the reality that corpo-
rate counsel's professional relationships have been established by and
with those corporate representatives. Because the unlawful conduct of
these agents will generally be attributed to the corporate principal, the
organization's lawyers must fulfill their comprehensive duty of compe-
tence in protecting the organization from any harm proposed by its
agents. This is the burden imposed by the traditional duty of competence
and its related ethical responsibilities. Failure of corporate counsel to sat-
isfy this burden in representing publicly-held corporate clients has sub-
stantially contributed to the endemic of financial fraud the country now
endures. Congress has recognized this failure and has authorized the
codification of this and other aspects of corporate counsel's fundamental
ethical duties to their clients.
41. MODEL RULES OF PROI'L CONDucr R. 2.1 cmt. (2002).
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366
(1992).




B. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
Congress, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, has required the SEC to rewrite
Model Rule 1.13 to require attorneys for publicly-held companies to re-
port not only violations, but also any evidence of violations of securities
laws, fiduciary obligations, and similar misconduct up the chain of com-
mand from the organization's general counsel to its chief executive of-
ficer, audit committee, and, ultimately, to its board of directors until an
appropriate resolution has been achieved. 46 This federal modification of
Model Rule 1.13 is only the beginning of a new era of federal regulation
of corporate counsel's conduct. Congress has further directed that the
SEC adopt, within 180 days of the Act's July 30, 2002 effective date, not
only rules implementing the lawyer's duty to report evidence of miscon-
duct, as discussed above, but also a federal code of legal ethics for lawyers
representing publicly-held corporations. 47
As a result of Congress's mandate to the SEC to promulgate federal
standards of professional conduct, we will see substantial preemption of
the state law standards that have been traditionally applied to measure
corporate counsel's professional performance. Because the SEC's re-
sponse to its standards-setting mandate has not yet been framed, we can-
not know how extensively the SEC will act in proposing standards for
lawyer's conduct and how those standards might materially modify our
present standards of professional conduct. 48 However, it is certain that
the new federal ethics rules will be considerably more stringent than
traditional, state-established rules and will lead to much higher national
standards of care for corporate counsel.
It is equally clear that the new statutory duty to report evidence of
fraud and breaches of fiduciary duty imposes an obligation on all corpo-
rate counsel to ensure that they possess a level of competence sufficient
to perform that duty. The federal statutory reporting requirement will
establish a new minimum standard, or floor, upon which lawyers must
construct standards of care through common behavior. Lawyer behavior
that comports with or improves upon this federally imposed duty will
build a national standard of care that necessarily will be incorporated into
the traditional duty of competency under the Model Rules. Competence
for corporate lawyers now must include those skills reasonably necessary
to fulfill the federally-imposed duty to recognize and report evidence of
financial fraud.
Similarly, the lawyer's reporting standard and the competency level
necessary to satisfy it will also be incorporated into the common law stan-
46. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).
47. Id.
48. The ABA understandably desires to influence the SEC's development of minimum
standards of conduct for corporate attorneys. It has recently established the ABA Task
Force on Implementation of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to coordinate
the ABA's response to the SEC's proposals. See ABA Creates Task Force to Provide
Views on SEC's Professional Conduct Rule, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1854 (Nov. 18,
2002).
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dard of care for civil liability, as expressed in the ALI's Restatement of
the Law Governing Lawyers: "For purposes of liability. .. , a lawyer who
owes a duty of care must exercise the competence and diligence normally
exercised by lawyers in similar circumstances. '49 By undertaking this
federally-imposed duty to report, the lawyer for the publicly-held com-
pany implicitly represents to the client that he or she has the requisite
competence to perform the lawyer's obligation to recognize and report
evidence of financial fraud. If the corporate lawyer fails to develop this
competence, personal liability could result. According to a former chair
of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act's lawyer reporting provisions constitute "a lawyer li-
ability act. ' '51 However, if there is a bright side, the federal duty to report
may provide corporate lawyers with considerably more leverage in con-
vincing corporate executives to reform their conduct in making public
disclosures of financial information. 5 1
In order to perform competently the duty to recognize and report finan-
cial fraud, corporate lawyers must have at least a rudimentary under-
standing of basic accounting principles. As one prominent professor of
corporate law has recently stated, "the professional duty of competence
should compel business lawyers to obtain a minimum level of accounting
knowledge. '52 Because an overwhelming number of corporate scandals
in recent years have involved abusive revenue recognition practices, cor-
porate attorneys, in order to fulfill their duty of competence, must be able
to understand and recognize the recurrent types of deceptive practices
that have and continue to be used to distort financial information dis-
closed to the SEC and the securities markets.
C. CORPORATE COUNSEL'S NEW DurY OF COMPETENCE
The SEC, in promulgating the mandatory reporting obligation and
other rules of professional conduct, should specifically address the corpo-
rate lawyer's duty of competency. Corporate counsel have long been ob-
ligated to ensure that their publicly-held corporate clients fully comply
with federal disclosure and other regulatory requirements imposed by the
Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)5 3 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (1934 Act).54 In addition, federal courts interpreting these require-
ments have repeatedly emphasized what Judge Kaufmann affirmed in
SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., that "the legal profession plays a unique and piv-
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52(1) (2000).
50. See Schmitt, supra note 26.
51. Id. According to Professor Richard Painter, ethics rules imposing reporting duties
on corporate counsel should provide lawyers "a lot more leverage in dealing with intransi-
gent clients." Id.
52. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing Accounting's Burden: Business Lawyers in En-
ron's Dark Shadows, 57 Bus. LAw. 1421, 1423 (2002); see also Ted J. Fiflis, Thoughts
Evoked by "Accounting and the New Corporate Law," 50 WASH. & L1EE L. REV. 959
(1993).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2002).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2002).
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otal role in the effective implementation of the securities laws."'55 More
recently, in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Den-
ver, N.A., the Supreme Court warned the legal profession that "any per-
son ...including a lawyer . ..who employs a manipulative device or
makes a material misstatement (or omission) ... may be liable as a pri-
mary violator under rule 10b-5." '56
Thus, corporate lawyers, in protecting their corporate clients and them-
selves from liability under the federal securities laws, must adhere to an
enhanced national standard of competency. Corporate lawyers must not
only have sufficient accounting expertise to read and understand corpo-
rate financial statements, but also must possess a familiarity with gener-
ally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). In defining lawyer
competency in the publicly-held corporation area of practice, the SEC
should adopt a duty of competence that expressly requires basic account-
ing knowledge. Federal standardization of this enhanced duty of compe-
tency, given the SEC's congressional mandate to rewrite the rules of
conduct for corporate lawyers, would be of significant practical benefit to
the legal profession, the publicly-held corporations they represent, and to
those corporations' employees, retirees, and investors.
The SEC's inclusion of basic accounting knowledge in the corporate
lawyers' federal duty of competence should not prove particularly oner-
ous. Most of the abusive practices used to perpetrate financial fraud have
been remarkably easy to comprehend. It is not at all difficult to develop
a familiarity with basic revenue recognition principles and the more com-
mon deceptive revenue recognition practices, including the red flags that
suggest their occurrence. If corporate lawyers are to perform any mean-
ingful role in the abatement of revenue-related fraud, they must be
knowledgeable of its contours. Corporate counsel must be integrally in-
volved in their organizational clients' public disclosure process, and,
among other things, should be fully aware of their clients' revenue recog-
nition policies, should independently verify whether those policies are be-
ing consistently applied, and should skeptically review all agreements
with affiliates, as well as contracts and other arrangements used to gener-
ate late-quarter revenues. Corporate counsel's fulfillment of their en-
hanced duty of competency would markedly improve the mandatory
disclosure process and could help restore the public's confidence in pub-
licly-held corporations and their securities. 57
55. SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
56. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 191 (1994).
57. See generally Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Dis-
closure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1 (1983).
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III. MATERIALITY AND GENERAL REVENUE
RECOGNITION PRINCIPLES
A. THE MATERIALITY DOCTRINE
Corporate counsel's development of the requisite competence to detect
and report any form of financial fraud must begin with an understanding
of the materiality doctrine. After all, the determination of materiality of
information is the central issue in satisfying corporate disclosure require-
ments and in avoiding civil and criminal liabilities under the federal se-
curities laws. 58 Materiality is also the central issue in the public
disclosure of corporate financial results and, through its definition and
related presumptions, constitutes the predominant principle of revenue
recognition. It has long been said that for corporate lawyers, materiality
is "the name of the game."' 59 They should know that materiality is the
name of the game not only for the prose but also for the numbers that
publicly-held corporations disclose to the market.
The common law has long defined a fact as material if "a reasonable
man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in deter-
mining his choice of action in the transaction in question. '60 The Su-
preme Court has functionalized this definition by changing the elusive
"reasonable man" to the equally elusive "reasonable investor."' 6' In do-
ing so, the Court expanded the common-law definition, changing "would
attach importance" to "a substantial likelihood" that he "would attach
importance" to the information at issue, in order to enable corporate ex-
ecutives and counsel to make materiality assessments in advance of pub-
lic disclosures. The Court's definition of materiality may be restated as
follows: A misrepresented fact or an omitted fact is material if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it impor-
tant in making an investment decision. It does not require proof of a
substantial likelihood that truthful disclosure of the fact would have been
a determinative factor in making an investment decision. Instead, it re-
quires only a showing that the misrepresented fact or the omitted fact
would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of a reasona-
ble investor. In other words, there must be a substantial likelihood that
the misrepresented fact or the omitted fact would have been viewed by
the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of
information made available.
In applying this functional, legal definition of materiality, corporate
counsel must make their materiality determinations based on what they
objectively believe the reasonable investor would consider important in a
wide variety of company, industry, and market related contexts. Lawyers
58. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77q(a), 78j(b), 78n(e) (2002).
59. RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 1000 (8th ed. 1998).
60. See RESTrATEMENr (SECoND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (1977).
61. The Supreme Court's definition of materiality was established in TSC Industries,
Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976), and later reaffirmed in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224 (1988), and Virginia Bankshares, Inc., v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
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for publicly-held companies should not assume that others involved in the
disclosure process understand materiality under the federal securities
laws or that they are not applying inconsistent definitions of materiality.
More particularly, counsel must recognize that the functional definition
they use in assessing their clients' disclosure obligations may substantially
differ from the definition understood or applied by the accounting
profession.
Accountants generally do not have legal training and certainly do not
possess the requisite expertise in the application of the securities laws or
familiarity with securities fraud case law resolving materiality issues. Ac-
countants (at least those acting without the assistance of securities law-
yers) are ill-equipped to make the legal materiality determinations
required by the SEC's mandatory disclosure system. Corporate counsel
and their clients should not expect accountants to engage in the unautho-
rized practice of securities law and should not rely on accountants to re-
solve materiality issues on their own.
Moreover, it is critical that corporate lawyers realize that accounting
materiality is substantially distinct from legal materiality. The accounting
profession's traditional definition states that information is material if
"the magnitude of an omission or misstatement of accounting informa-
tion, in the light of surrounding circumstances, makes it probable that the
judgment of a reasonable person relying on the information would have
been changed or influenced by the omission or misstatement. '62 The
more obvious contrasts between accounting materiality and legal materi-
ality are the former's focus on the implicitly numerical magnitude rather
than the actual significance of the information, its inherent limitation to
accounting information, and its reference to the information's probable
effect on changing the reasonable person's judgment. Moreover, al-
though the definition requires consideration of surrounding circum-
stances, it fails to suggest that consideration must be given not simply to
information within the accountant's rather limited domain, but to the to-
tal mix of information their corporate clients have made available to in-
vestors. Indeed, accounting materiality does not even refer to reasonable
investors, but to the a priori rationality of reasonable persons.
Accountants are generally unaware of the broader context in which
legal materiality assessments must be made and are not competent to
make those determinations. Moreover, accountants have generally
viewed the materiality doctrine as a mechanism that protects corporate
clients and themselves against their own mistakes and not as a concept
that facilitates a full disclosure system for the protection of investors. In
a leading text on auditing standards, the authors state that "materiality
represents a cushion that the auditor allows for the necessary imprecision
in applying auditing procedures to detect misstatements of the financial
62. QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION, Statement of Fi-




statements. '63 While acknowledging the non-existence of any authorita-
tive standards for percentage guidelines in assessing materiality, they
have stated that common guidelines used by auditors are five to ten per-
cent of income or one percent of total assets or revenues. 64 The large gap
between accountants' numerical, quantitative perspective on materiality
and lawyers' more broadly contextual, qualitative perspective, may have
contributed disastrously to the systemic financial fraud we have recently
experienced. 65
The necessity of legal resolutions for materiality questions becomes
equally obvious when one appreciates that the assessment of materiality
is far more qualitative than quantitative. This principle obviously flows
63. DAN M. GuY ET AL., AuDrIlrING 137 (4th ed. 1996).
64. Id. at 137-38.
65. Another significant contributing factor to the present systemic failure in financial
reporting may be the basic change over the last twenty years in auditing methodology.
Generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) have long required auditors to secure evi-
dentiary support for their audit opinions through inspection, observation, inquiries, and
confirmations. AU § 326.01. However, in what can only be described as meta-auditing,
auditors have come to focus more on how their corporate clients generate financial data
through computerized bookkeeping systems and internal controls rather than on actual
numbers. Increasingly, auditors are moving away from their traditional methodology
under which they reviewed large numbers of actual transactions to verify bookkeeping
results. According to a recent study by Professors Steve Sutton and Charles Cullinan, this
radical change in approach by auditors, relying more on internal controls than review of
specific accounts, has resulted in a significantly reduced capacity for fraud detection. Ken
Brown, Auditors' Methods Make It Hard to Catch Fraud by Executives, WALL Si. J., July 8,
2002, at Cl. Although computer programs and internal controls may prevent fraud by low
level employees, the study concludes that these controls can be readily circumvented by
corporate executives. See Steve G. Sutton & Charles P. Cullinan, Defrauding the Public
Interest: A Critical Examination of Reengineered Audit Processes and the Likelihood of
Detecting Fraud, 13 CRITICAL PERSI'. AcCr. 297 (2002). The authors, analyzing some 276
SEC enforcement actions during the period from 1987 to 1999, found that the defendant
companies' chief executive officers were involved in roughly seventy percent of these
frauds. Id.
Moreover, accountants performing the auditing function may not view fraud detection as
within the scope of their relationships with their corporate clients. Audits conducted pur-
suant to GAAS rarely involve the authentication of underlying transactional documents.
See Scott J. Paltrow, Accounting-Overhaul Plans Draw Skepticism, WALL ST. J., July 8,
2002, at Cl. Despite the recommendation of an SEC panel of experts, auditors are not
required to make unannounced visits to corporate client locations, surprise recounts of
inventory, or requests to customers and vendors for written confirmation of underlying
transactions. Id. According to the auditing director of the American Institute of Indepen-
dent Certified Accountants, "[i]f management wants to hire their CPA to conduct a fraud
investigation or a forensic audit we are more than willing to enter into those types of
special engagements." Id. One can only conclude that if corporate counsel relies on corpo-
rate accountants and corporate accountants rely on corporate counsel to detect financial
fraud, little, if any, corporate fraud will be detected.
In addition to the accounting profession's weak form materiality doctrine, its reliance on
meta-auditing, and its perceived limitations on scope of review, another contributing factor
to the current financial crisis may be accounting firms' unconscious bias in favor of their
corporate clients' management. Max H. Bazerman et al., Why Good Accountants Do Bad
Audits, 80 HARV. Bus. Rev. 97 (2002). The authors of a recent article addressing auditor
bias have concluded that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not address this fundamental prob-
lem. Id. They have recommended, among other things, that Congress impose mandatory
rotation on auditing firms, prohibit auditor termination during the contract term, and bar




from the Supreme Court's refusal to adopt bright-line rules for material-
ity on the basis that any such rules would always be over-inclusive or
under-inclusive, given the radically different disclosure contexts in which
decisions must be made. 66 In fact, most decisions resolving materiality
issues have not focused so much on quantitative financial reporting errors
as they have on qualitative issues like managerial competence. For exam-
ple, in In re Franchard Corporation, the SEC stated that the quality of a
corporation's management was "of cardinal importance in any business,"
and that "evaluation of the quality of management ... is an essential
ingredient of informed investment decision. '6 7 The concept of qualita-
tive materiality addresses not only managerial ability and performance,
but also numerous concerns that reflect on managerial integrity, conflicts
of interest, violations of criminal and civil laws, and, of course, manage-
rial representations to investors, particularly where management has pub-
licly emphasized the information as important to attainment of its goals.
The SEC has continually affirmed the principle that qualitative criteria
should predominate over quantitative criteria in making materiality
determinations.
The SEC, in its Staff Accounting Bulletin 99 (SAB 99), reaffirmed its
position that no quantitative presumptions should be followed in making
materiality determinations. 68 The SEC stated that quantitative standards
were not acceptable and had no support under the accounting and audit-
ing literature. 69 The SEC issued this bulletin primarily to remind ac-
countants and others involved in satisfying corporate disclosure
obligations that percentage-based rules of thumb were critically deficient.
Many accounting professionals have continued to apply a presumption
that information that accounts for ten percent or more of a company's
total assets, revenues, or net earnings is material, along with a corollary
presumption that information that accounts for less than five percent is
not material, leaving a materiality purgatory of information that accounts
for five to ten percent. According to the SEC, "qualitative factors may
cause misstatements of quantitatively small amounts to be material. ' 71
The SEC was influenced by the Financial Accounting Standards Board's
position that "magnitude by itself, without regard to the nature of the
item and the circumstances in which the judgment has to be made, will
not generally be a sufficient basis for a materiality judgment."7 1
In SAB 99, the SEC identified a number of qualitative factors that
could cause misstatements of quantitatively small amounts to be material.
These factors included, among others, the following:
66. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
67. In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. Docket 163 (1964).
68. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, Release No. SAB 99, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 75,563 [hereinafter SAB 99].
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See FASCON 2, supra note 62.
2003]
SMU LAW REVIEW
* Whether the misstatement masks a change in earnings or other
trends,
" Whether the misstatement hides a failure to meet analyst's
expectations,
" Whether the misstatement changes a loss into income or vice versa,
" Whether the misstatement concerns an area of the company's busi-
ness that has been identified as being significant to its operations or
profitability,
" Whether the misstatement affects the company's compliance with
loan covenants or other contractual requirements,
" Whether the misstatement results in an increase in management's
compensation, and
" Whether the misstatement involves concealment of an unlawful
transaction. 72
Each of these factors explains why quality rules quantity in materiality
determinations.
The SEC's position in SAB 99 has been highly persuasive in materiality
litigation. For example, in Ganino v. Citizens Utilities Co., the defendant
corporation, to make up for a revenue loss in 1996, booked $22 million of
guaranty fees actually received in 1995.73 The company allegedly recog-
nized revenues prematurely in order to manage its income trends. Be-
cause these fees accounted for only 1.7% of the company's 1.996 revenue,
the lower court applied the so-called five percent rule to conclude that
the misstatements of revenue were immaterial. 74 The Second Circuit,
agreeing with SAB 99, reversed. 75 The court held that because the corpo-
ration reached its publicly-announced earnings projections through im-
proper revenue recognition, a reasonable investor would have considered
the misstatements to have materially altered the total available mix of
information about the company. 76
Similarly, in In re Unisys Corp. Securities Litigation, the company's
press releases touted increased demands for its services and disclosed
large contracts with British Telecommunications and the U.S. govern-
ment as evidence of heightened demand. 77 The corporation failed to dis-
close the uncertain nature of these contracts and that the revenues
represented were not definitely committed.78 The company argued that
the misrepresentation was not material because each contract repre-
sented only .6% of its annual revenue.79 Relying on the Third Circuit's
opinion in In re Westinghouse Securities Litigation, which expressly disap-
proved of any reliance on a quantitative materiality threshold,1, the court
72. SAB 99, supra note 68.
73. Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 159 (2d Cir. 2000).
74. Id. at 158.
75. Id. at 171.
76. Id. at 166.
77. In re Unisys Corp. Sec. Litig., 2000 WL 1367951, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2000).
78. Id. at *4.
79. Id. at *5.
80. In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696 (3d Cir. 1996).
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rejected any mathematical approach to materiality. 81 The court in Unisys
found the disclosure of the two indefinite contracts material. It applied
one of SAB 99's qualitative tests of materiality, questioning whether the
misstatement concerned some portion of the company's business that had
been identified as playing a significant role in the company's operations. 82
Corporate counsel should always recognize that qualitative materiality
requires consideration of each piece of information in the larger totality
of corporate information made available to investors.
In developing their understanding of qualitative materiality, corporate
counsel have considerable resources, including the generally applicable
disclosure principles set forth in the SEC's disclosure rules, numerous ad-
ministrative and judicial pronouncements, and well-regarded disclosure
guides. 83 In applying these principles, corporate counsel must be com-
pletely familiar with the client-specific information found in their clients'
financial and compliance audits, SEC filings, press releases, and confer-
ence calls, as well as various analyses of their clients published in the
financial press. Perhaps most importantly, counsel must develop their
own independent understanding of the economic substance of their cli-
ents' business operations and its related plans and strategies. Obviously,
this requires continual effort by counsel to inform themselves about the
ongoing strengths and weaknesses of their clients' operations. By com-
paring their continually updated understanding of the economic sub-
stance of their clients' business operations with publicly-disseminated
information about their clients, corporate counsel will be reasonably posi-
tioned to notice and inquire about inconsistencies. In many, if not most,
instances, corporate counsel's diligence should result in internal resolu-
tions of issues precluding resort to their new reporting obligations under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
Despite their inability to apply bright-line rules in making materiality
assessments, corporate counsel should, as a practical matter, recognize
and apply certain presumptions of materiality. They can be grouped into
four categories: (1) information subject to obligatory disclosure under the
SEC disclosure rules (the regulatory materiality presumption); (2) infor-
mation regarding misconduct involving illegality, undisclosed self-dealing,
or conduct otherwise bearing on managerial integrity (the integrity issues
presumption); (3) information identified by the company as important to
assessments of its financial position (the emphasized information pre-
sumption); and (4) information strongly related to issues of concern to
financial analysts and journalists that have been publicly expressed (the
81. Unisys, 2000 WL 1367951, at *5.
82. Id. at *6.
83. See, e.g., J. ROBERT BROWN, JR., THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
(3d ed. 1999); ARNOLD S. JACOBS, MANUAL OF CORPORATE FORMS FOR SECURITIES
PRACTICE (1981); HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FED-
ERAL CORPORATE LAW (2d ed. 1998); A.A. SOMMER, JR., SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES




public issues presumption). Although these presumptions are hardly ex-
clusive and are not expressly established by the SEC or the courts, pru-
dent corporate counsel have long used these presumptions both in
conducting due diligence in connection with their clients' securities offer-
ings and in resolving materiality issues incident to their clients' periodic
reporting obligations, press releases and other public disclosures.
The regulatory presumption of materiality arises from the disclosure re-
quirements imposed upon publicly-held corporations by the 1933 Act, the
1934 Act, 4 and by the SEC's rules and forms under both statutes. Be-
cause Congress and the SEC have made policy decisions resulting in spe-
cific mandatory disclosure of certain types of information, a strong
presumption exists that information specifically required to be disclosed
is material. Accordingly, "lawyers can safely assume that required disclo-
sure items may be presumed to be material. '85 However, the corollary is
not true. In other words, the failure of SEC rules to require the disclo-
sure does not suggest that the information at issue is not material. In fact,
Rule 408 under the 1933 Act states: "In addition to the information ex-
pressly required to be included in a registration statement, there shall be
added such further material information, if any, as may be necessary to
make the required statements, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading. '86 Similarly, Rule 12b-20 under the
1934 Act, and incorporated into the SEC's periodic report forms, states:
"In addition to the information expressly required to be included in a
statement or report, there shall be added such further material informa-
tion, if any, as may be necessary to make the required statements, in the
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading. '87
Consequently, the determination of materiality always begins with the
SEC's rules and forms, but rarely, if ever, ends there.
The integrity issues presumption of materiality results from the overrid-
ing significance of managerial integrity to investors. Under the standard
corporate governance model, investors, as shareholders, are protected by
fiduciary obligations owed to them by the directors and officers who have
voluntarily assumed managerial responsibility for the corporation's assets
on behalf of shareholder investors. These corporate managers, while pro-
tected themselves by a presumption of regularity in their business judg-
ments, 88 have common law and statutory duties to investors not to engage
in illegal acts, 89 self-dealing, or any other breaches of trust that would
84. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
85. See JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 59, at 1010; see also Howing Co. v. Nationwide
Corp., 927 F.2d 263 (6th Cir.), rev'd, 502 U.S. 801 (1991) (holding that information re-
quired by SEC Rule 13e-3 created a presumption of materiality). "The presumed fact-
that the investor would likely find disclosure of such information significant-follows from
[the rule's] insistence that the information be stated." Howing, at 265.
86. 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (2002).
87. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2002).
88. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982). See generally DENNIS J. BLOCK
ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RuiLE (3d ed. 1989).
89. See, e.g., Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
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violate their duty of loyalty.9°1 Given the continual emphasis by the SEC
and the courts on the critical importance of managerial integrity to inves-
tors, information related to illegal conduct or breaches of the duty of loy-
alty owed to shareholders should be viewed as presumptively material.91
The emphasized information presumption is based on the premise that
investors in publicly-held companies place a high degree of credibility on
information emphasized by management in their public disclosures. In
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, the Court explained that investors
attach a great deal of significance to corporate managers' statements of
reasons, opinions, or beliefs because "[s]hareholders know that directors
usually have knowledge and expertness far exceeding the normal inves-
tor's resources, and the directors' perceived superiority is magnified even
further by the common knowledge that state law customarily obliges
them to exercise their judgment in the shareholders' interests. ' 92 As em-
phasized by the Ninth Circuit in In re Apple Computer Securities Litiga-
tion, "the investing public justifiably places heavy reliance on the
statements and opinions of corporate insiders."'93 Consequently, it should
be presumed that there is a substantial likelihood that information em-
phasized by management in its press releases, conference calls, and re-
ports would be viewed by the reasonable investor as significant in making
investment decisions.
Similarly, the public issues presumption of materiality is based on the
high degree of credibility accorded by investors to analysts' reports, as
well as articles in the financial press, publicly raising issues regarding the
financial positions of publicly-held companies. Information regarding
these issues would generally be viewed by the reasonable investor as sig-
nificant in making investment decisions. It is well-known that analysts
have a duty to independently investigate the principal determinants of
financial performance, competitive outlook, and major risks faced by a
company. For example, if an analyst in a research report has raised seri-
ous questions about growth in quarterly sales revenues, management's
disclosures regarding the issues raised by the analyst would be viewed as
significant by the reasonable investor. The same would be true with re-
spect to issues raised in the financial press. Management frequently re-
acts with outright denials or undertakes twists or spins to refute or
neutralize the adverse impact of analysts' reports on investor perceptions
about a given company. Certainly, informational issues considered im-
portant by analysts and financial journalists would also be considered im-
portant by the less sophisticated reasonable investor.
Corporate counsel who have a developed comprehension of qualitative
materiality and the foregoing presumptions of materiality are well-posi-
90. See, e.g., Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976).
91. See, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that informa-
tion involving a breach of trust or self-dealing is presumptively material).
92. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1091 (1991).
93. In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 1989).
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tioned to address revenue recognition issues that regularly confront cor-
porate managers. However, they also must be generally familiar with
established principles of revenue recognition. Given their new federally
mandated ethical responsibilities, the corporate lawyer should ignore Al-
exander Pope's maxim: "A little learning is a dangerous thing."'94 It has
become much more dangerous, at least for lawyers, not to have a little
knowledge of basic accounting principles. At the very least, corporate
counsel possessing general familiarity with revenue recognition principles
will tend to be less deferential and less gullible in confrontations with
corporate representatives professing financial or accounting expertise.
B. GENERAL REVENUE RECOGNITION PRINCIPLES
In addition to securing a fundamental grounding in the materiality doc-
trine, the corporate lawyer must possess at least an elemental understand-
ing of the principles applicable to the financial determination of their
corporate clients' revenues. As indicated previously, a large percentage
of financial frauds in recent years have involved abusive revenue recogni-
tion practices. The appropriate recognition of revenues is largely deter-
mined by GAAP. The most important of these accounting principles, and
certainly the beginning point for corporate counsel in this area, is that
companies must always exalt the substance of a transaction over its
form.95 The SEC has repeatedly emphasized that the best established
tenet of GAAP is that transactions must be accounted for in accordance
with their substance rather than their form. 96 This is the first cardinal
rule, both for corporate lawyers and corporate accountants.
The second cardinal rule for corporate counsel to recognize is that the
financial statements of their clients must be prepared in accordance with
GAAP or they will be presumed to be misleading under the SEC's Regu-
lation S-X. 97 The GAAP most often referred to in the determination of
94. ALEXANDER PO1w-, An Essay on Criticism, in Ti-E COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS
OF ALEXANDER POPE 70 (Henry W. Boynton ed., Riverside Press 1903).
95. FASCON 2, supra note 62, § 169.
96. In re Cypress Bioscience, Inc., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release
No. 817 (Sept. 19, 1996).
97. 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(1) (2002). For lawyers generally unfamiliar with Regula-
tion S-X, the accountant's counterpart to the SEC's Regulation S-K, 16 C.F.R. § 229.300
(2002), useful guidance is available. See, e.g., William J. Grant, Jr., Regulation S-X: A Pri-
mer for the Practitioner, in SECURITIES UNDERWRITING: A PRACTITIONER's GuIDE 343
(1985). Although failure to follow GAAP creates a presumption that the financial state-
ments are misleading, the corollary is not true. In other words, compliance with GAAP
does not create a presumption that the financial statements are not misleading. Recently,
the SEC's chief accountant stated that financial statements technically in compliance with
GAAP could still be materially misleading if those financial statements do not accurately
reflect the company's financial position. Steve Liesman, SEC Accounting Cop's Warning:
Playing by Rules May Not Ward Off Fraud Issues, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2002, at C1. Cor-
porate lawyers must recognize that GAAP often provides accountants wide latitude to
make judgment calls and, therefore, lawyers must act as gatekeepers in ensuring that mate-
riality and economic substance always overrule technical GAAP decisions. See In re
Adaptive Broadband Sec. Litig., No. C 01- 1092 SC, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5887 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 2, 2002) (GAAP violations support inference of intent to deceive); In re McKesson
HBOC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1273 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (observing that "books
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when revenues are realized and, hence, should be recognized by a corpo-
rate enterprise, include the following:
" Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements of Business
Enterprises, Statement of Accounting Concepts No. 5 (FASCON
5),98
" SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101, Revenue Recognition in Fi-
nancial Statements (SAB 101), 99
" Revenue Recognition When Right of Return Exists, Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 48 (FAS 48),oo
" American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Software Reve-
nue Recognition, Statement of Position No. 97-2 (SOP 97-2),1 °1
" Long-Term Construction-Type Contracts, Accounting Research Bul-
letin No. 45 (ARB 45),102 and
" Accounting for Performance of Construction-Type and Certain Pro-
duction-Type Contracts, Statement of Position 81-1 (American Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants 1981) (SOP 81-1).I3
If these principles were reduced to their simplest form, all would reiterate
the adage, "[d]on't count your chickens before they hatch,"11I4 perhaps
adding, "and before they are unconditionally sold, shipped, delivered,
and accepted by creditworthy customers."
For corporate counsel, understanding the SEC's Staff Accounting Bul-
letin No. 101, Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements (SAB
101),05 should substantially contribute to their development of the neces-
sary familiarity with revenue recognition principles. The SEC issued this
bulletin in late 1999, at least partly in response to the Treadway Commis-
sion Committee of Sponsoring Organization's (COSO) report, Fraudulent
Financial Reporting: 1987-1997, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies.'0 6
The COSO Report concluded that over half of the financial reporting
do not cook themselves"); Gelfer v. Pegasystems, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d 10, 15 (D. Mass.
2000) (violations of company's accounting standards probative of scienter); Simpson v.
Specialty Retail Concepts, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 323, 328 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (GAAP violations
indicate violations of antifraud rules).
98. RECOGNITION AND MEASUREMENT IN FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BUSINESS EN-
TERPRISES, Statement of Accounting Concepts No. 5 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.
1984).
99. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101, Release No. SAB 101, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,936
(Dec. 9, 1999) [hereinafter SAB 101].
100. REVENUE RECOGNITION WHEN RIGHT OF RETURN ExIsrs, Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 48 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1981) [hereinafter FAS 48].
101. SOFI-WARE REVENUE RECOGNITION, Statement of Position No. 97-2 (Am. Inst. of
Certified Pub. Accountants 1997) [hereinafter SOP 97-2].
102. LONG-TERM CONSTRUCI-ION-TYPE CONTRACTS, Accounting Research Bulletin
No. 45 (Am. Inst. of Accountants 1955). See generally David Herwitz, Accounting for
Long-term Construction Contracts: A Lawyer's Approach., 70 HARV. L. REV. 449 (1957).
103. ACCOUNTING FOR PERFORMANCE OF CONSTRUC-ION-TYPE AND CERTAIN PRO-
DUC-ION-TYPE CONTRACTS, Statement of Position No. 81-1 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 1981).
104. In re Microstrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 115 F. Supp. 2d 620, 638 (E.D. Va. 2000).
105. SAB 101, supra note 99.
106. MARK S. BEASLEY ET AL., FINANCIAL REPORTING: 1987-1997, AN ANALYSIS OF
U.S. PUBLIC COMPANIES (Inst. of Internal Auditors 1999).
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frauds during the ten year period had involved the overstatement of reve-
nue. SAB 101 described the basic framework for recognizing revenues by
identifying four bedrock principles, which state that revenue becomes re-
alized or realizable and earned when all of the following criteria are
satisfied:
" persuasive evidence of an arrangement exists,
" delivery has occurred or services have been rendered,
" the seller's price to the buyer is fixed or determinable, and
" collectibility is reasonably assured.
According to the SEC's former Chief Accountant, Lynn E. Turner, this
general framework "could not be simpler-it is based on the common
sense notion that revenue on a sale should not be recognized until the
seller has fulfilled its obligations to the buyer under the sale
arrangement."'107
Shortly after the SEC issued SAB 101, an accounting professor de-
scribed the SEC's bulletin as "promulgating the obvious."' 10 He had con-
ducted an undergraduate class exercise in which he asked his students
what criteria should be met before a company recognized revenue. In
less than four minutes, they listed three requirements: an actual sale of
goods or services, a specified price, and the ability to collect. He subse-
quently posed the same question to a group of professional auditors, who
listed the same criteria in the same amount of time. The criteria quickly
identified by both students and accounting professionals are strikingly
similar to the core revenue recognition principles identified in SAB 101.
The accounting professor concluded, "[i]t is regrettable when the SEC
feels a need to promulgate, as a formal rule, that which should be totally
obvious to even marginally qualified accountants," and that "[w]e ac-
countants need to look at ourselves and how we have participated in or
even been the architects of management fraud."'' 9 Corporate counsel, in
order to comport with their own standards of care, must also look at
themselves and ask whether they too have participated in or have been
the architects of management fraud. It is patently clear that they can no
longer defer to the accounting profession on the larger issues of material-
ity and the core principles of revenue recognition.
Corporate counsel, in developing their general understanding of reve-
nue recognition principles, could reasonably synthesize SAB 101 and its
underlying GAAP as a basic rule that states as follows.
Revenue should only be recognized when:
- the company has persuasive evidence of a firm agreement,
107. Lynn E. Turner, Revenue Recognition, Presentation at the USC SEC and Finan-
cial Reporting Institute (May 31, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch
495.htm.
108. Ronald M. Mano, The SEC Promulgates the Obvious, Accr. TODAY, Apr. 17,
2000, at 16.
109. Id.; see also Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral
Insight Into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 133 (2000).
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* the company has made a favorable assessment of the buyer's
creditworthiness,
" the company has completed the earnings process,
* the company's goods or services have been exchanged for cash or
claims to cash,
* the company's goods have been shipped to the buyer and the risks
and rewards of ownership have passed to the buyer,
* the company's goods must not be subject to a right of return (unless
the amount of future returns can be reasonably estimated and a rea-
sonable reserve for returns has been established),
" the company's right to payment is not otherwise conditional, voida-
ble or cancelable, and
* the company has satisfied the foregoing criteria within the same re-
porting period.
Corporate counsel should readily observe that this basic rule requires
consideration of contractual performances by their corporate clients, an
area that squarely falls within their education, training, and experience in
handling business transactions. It would be tantamount to malpractice to
abdicate their responsibilities as legal experts to corporate accountants
and then cower behind those accountants when the corporate client is
subsequently charged with financial fraud.
IV. COMMON DECEPTIVE REVENUE
RECOGNITION PRACTICES
A general review of the more common deceptive revenue recognition
practices will illustrate dramatically how far afield these schemes are from
both the four bedrock principles identified by the SEC in SAB 101 and
from the basic rule I have distilled from GAAP. Corporate counsel
should readily recognize these practices as manipulative devices that raise
material issues not only regarding corporate financial statements but also
the lack of managerial integrity that permitted their use in the first place.
Consequently, these schemes are virtually always accompanied by major
breaches of corporate disclosure obligations to publicly disclose the ac-
tual use of these schemes, the names of managerial perpetrators and their
degree of participation in structuring, executing, and approving these
schemes, in addition to the actual revenues that should have been re-
ported had these deceptive devices not been employed. These devices, all
violative of GAAP, include, among others, fictitious contracts, roundtrip-
ping or boomerangs, unordered shipments, unshipped orders, misdated
contracts, consignment transactions, improper bill and hold sales, ship
and store sales, inventory parking, buy back transactions, contingent
sales, try-buy contracts, improper right of return contracts, inflated barter
transactions, cookie jar reserves, and channel stuffing. Each of these de-





The creation of fictitious contracts and booking nonexistent revenues
from those contracts is the most extreme deceptive revenue recognition
device. In order to avoid detection by auditors, corporate personnel
often fabricate purchase order forms, shipping documents, and invoices.
Where the fabricated contracts involve the sales of goods, corporate per-
sonnel may physically conceal the inventory purportedly sold, either by
storage at different warehouses or by shipment for storage by third par-
ties who have no obligation to make payment. Of course, this manipula-
tive practice creates phony accounts receivable, often due from either
nonexistent customers or from specially created entities that in turn sell
goods or services to the company at offsetting prices in what amounts to
wash transactions or simple exchanges of checks with no economic
substance.
In one recent case, SEC v. Anderson, the SEC charged that a com-
pany's chief executive officer personally forged contracts, e-mails,
purchase orders, correspondence, and an audit confirmation while creat-
ing three fake transactions and then booked $1.3.7 million in revenues
from these nonexistent sales.' ' " In one instance, the same officer simply
altered a $1.5 million purchase order to $6 million worth of the com-
pany's goods and services in order to exaggerate revenues. '' In another
case, Holmes v. Baker, the company's headquarters allegedly would gen-
erate false invoices for aircraft engines at the end of the company's finan-
cial quarters and recognize revenues based on those invoices. 112
Subsequently, it would transmit those phony invoices by computer to its
warehouses, where the company's warehouse supervisors would instruct
employees not to ship the products. After the close of the quarter, the
orders would be manually concealed.' 13 Recognition of revenue based
on fictitious orders, as indicated by this example, frequently involves nu-
merous corporate employees, generally acting at the direction of supervi-
sors and upper-level management. 14
B. ROUNDTRIPI'ING
Roundtripping is another commonly used device to create revenue in
order to falsely show demonstrable growth in a corporation's business
activities. To implement this device, a company simply provides funds to
its customers or other third parties to finance their purchases of the com-
pany's goods or services without any reasonable expectation that these
customers will ever repay those funds. The customer pays for the goods
or services with the company's funds, creating revenues for the company,
110. SEC v. Anderson, 77 S.E.C. Docket 2069 (May 20, 2002).
111. /d.
112. Holmes v. Baker, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
113. Id. at 1368.
114. See, e.g., SEC v. Madera Int'l, Inc., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act
Release No. 1453 (Sept. 19, 2001).
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while the customer is not expected to repay the funds advanced by the
company to fund the purchase. In one case, SEC v. Mikailli, the company
used the foregoing device, as well as two other variants.'15 In one of the
other variants, the company covered the advance of funds to customers
by contracting to purchase services from customers through "funded de-
velopment agreements." ' 1 6 The customers never provided those services
and used the company's funds to buy the company's products. In the
other variant, the company made an investment in another entity and
then used most of the invested funds to buy its own products.117 As a
result of these deceptive devices, the company was able to overstate its
revenue over four fiscal quarters in amounts ranging from 61% to 150%
per quarter. 1 8 In all three types of manipulative transactions, the com-
pany booked revenues by causing its own funds to take a roundtrip
through the customer's or another entity's hands.
The roundtripping device has numerous variants. In a recent enforce-
ment action, SEC v. Hill, the SEC charged a company's officers with
fraud for recognizing revenue from a purported $3 million software sale
initiated on the last day of the company's reporting period.' 19 Due to the
company's failure to close a large contract with a major customer by
quarter-end, the company's general counsel allegedly arranged a sham
transaction with a distributor. To induce this last minute sale, he orally
agreed that the distributor would not have to pay for the subject software
because the seller itself would effect resales to end users. He also orches-
trated the provision of $4 million in letters of credit to finance the distrib-
utor's payment of the resulting $3 million receivable and delivered false
board resolutions to the lender. 120 A company's recognition and report-
ing of revenues on these types of transactions obviously constitutes fla-
grant financial fraud.
C. UNORDERED SHIPMENTS
In order to inflate revenues, a company may ship goods to third parties
that never ordered the goods and immediately book revenues repre-
sented by the price of those shipments, even though it is highly probable
that the products will be returned or, in any event, that the company's
invoices will never be paid. For example, in Chu v. Sabratek Corp., it was
alleged that the company, among other things, shipped almost $1 million
of inventory to a medical firm that had never ordered from or even dis-
tributed products for the company.1 21 It was also alleged that another




119. SEC v. Hill, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 1582 (June
21, 2002).
120. Id.; see also SEC Files Actions Against Several Officials at Software Firm, Yielding
Two Settlements, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1074 (July 1, 2000) at 1074.
121. Chu v. Sabratek Corp., 100 F. Supp. 2d 815, 821 (E.D. 111. 2000).
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firm received "so many [unordered] excess Sabratek pumps that they
used them as impromptu workspace dividers."'122 In another case, In re
McKesson HBOC, Inc. Securities Litigation,l2 3 a hospital customer en-
gaged in negotiations with McKesson HBOC broke off negotiations on a
large purchase order, but McKesson HBOC, after being told the deal was
not going to close, went ahead and invoiced the sale, shipped the prod-
ucts, and booked the revenue. 2 4 According to one of McKesson
HBOC's salesmen, "[i]t was common knowledge that if you thought you
would get the order, and it was close to the end of quarter, then you'd tell
them to ship the software."' 25 Consequently, the company would book
the revenue represented by the shipped product regardless of whether it
was actually ordered by the customer. 2 6
D. UNSHIPPED ORDERS
In many instances, a company will book revenue on existent orders
before shipping the ordered products. In SEC v. Gallo, the SEC alleged
that a company's president ordered a sales manager to record the sale of
the company's products prior to shipment in order to fraudulently in-
crease the company's revenues. 27 To avoid detection, the president then
ordered the chief financial officer to hold the company's books open past
the quarter end while the sales manager backdated sales invoices and
shipping documents. 128 These practices not only violated GAAP, but
also the company's own revenue recognition policy that sales revenues
would only be recognized when products were actually shipped. 129 Ac-
cording to the SEC, the company routinely recorded revenues prior to
shipment for almost three years, primarily at the end of each quarter to
increase its reported quarterly and annual revenues.' 3° This practice vio-
lates GAAP largely because the company has not passed the risks and
rewards of ownership in its products to customers. The company, accord-
ingly, was not permitted to book revenue on sales of products prior to
122. Id. (alteration in original).
123. In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Sec. Litig., t26 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1257.
126. For other examples of the unordered shipment device, see In re Adaptive Broad-
band Sec. Litig., No. C 01-1092 SC, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5887 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2002)
and In re Beth A. Morris & Stephen H. Grant, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act
Release No. 1243 (Mar. 29, 2000). See also Calif. Firm, Executive Settle Charges; Auditor
Faces Action in Reporting Case, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 66 (Jan. 14, 2002) (Califor-
nia Software Corp. settled SEC charges that the company recognized revenue on
unordered shipments of software).
127. SEC v. Gallo, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 1521 (Mar.
13, 2002); see In re IGI, Inc., 77 S.E.C. Docket 258 (Mar. 12, 2002); In re Donald J.
Macphee, 77 S.E.C. Docket 55 (Mar. 12, 2002); In re William Dickson & Stephen Collins,
77 S.E.C. Docket 251 (Mar. 12, 2002); see also SEC Sues Former IG President, Seeks
Return of Stock Options, Bonuses, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 455 (Mar. 18, 2002).






delivery to its customers. 13' In another case, In re Secure Computing
Corp. Securities Litigation, it was alleged that the defendant company de-
liberately warehoused unfinished hardware ordered by the National Se-
curity Agency.' 32 Despite the absence of delivery and any payment
obligation, the company recognized the revenues represented by the or-
der. The court found that, for pleading purposes, these allegations were
sufficient to support a finding that the company's revenue recognition
was deliberately reckless. 133
E. MISDATED CONTRACTS AND RELATED TIMING ABUSES
Companies have frequently resorted to misdating contracts in order to
manipulate the timing of revenue recognition. Companies challenged by
quarter-end revenue goals implement this abusive revenue recognition
device by backdating contracts, thereby borrowing revenue from the cur-
rent quarter to inflate revenues for the preceding quarter. In one illustra-
tive case, a company prematurely recognized revenues in one quarter and
directed its personnel to misdate packing lists, shipping records, and in-
voices in order to conceal that shipments were not made until the suc-
ceeding quarter. 134
Related timing abuses are often perpetrated by companies without
backdating their contracts. A company may simply elect to recognize
revenues before those contracts come into existence. This fraudulent
practice is best exemplified by allegations in In re Microstrategy, Inc. Se-
curities Litigation. 35 According to the complaint, the company recog-
nized license revenues in the third quarter of 1999 from a contract with
NCR, even though the agreement was not finalized until the fourth quar-
ter of 1999.136 Because this contract accounted for almost half of the
company's license revenue for the third quarter, the company's recogni-
tion of these revenues allowed the company to report a profit of $.09 per
share versus a loss of $.30 per share for the quarter. In addition, it recog-
nized revenues in the fourth quarter from two large contracts that were
not executed by the parties until after the company's fiscal year ended on
December 31, 1999. Again, improper revenue recognition converted sub-
stantial losses for the quarter into substantial profitability. Remarks by
the company's president during a Washington Post interview came back
to haunt him in this case. In the interview, he stated that "[i]n the public
world there's a difference between 11:59 and 12:01, the last day of
March."' 137 He explained that if a major contract is signed at 12:01 and
131. ld.: see also In re Peritus Software Serv., Inc., Accounting and Auditing Enforce-
ment Act Release No. 1247 (Apr. 13, 2000).
132. In re Secure Computing Corp. Sec. Litig., 184 F. Supp. 2d 980 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
133. Id. at 988-99.
134. In re Pinnacle Micro, Inc., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No.
975 (Oct. 3, 1997).
135. In re Microstrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 115 F. Supp. 2d 620 (E.D. Va. 2000).
136. Id. at 626.
137. Id. at 640.
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revenue is recognized in the first quarter, "the stock is up $500 million"; if
the revenue is recognized in the second quarter, "you've just torched the
life and livelihood of a thousand families."' 138 He asked, "Would you sac-
rifice a thousand people's lives for one minute of integrity, or would you,
like, put the clock back?" and explained that this was a dilemma he had
to "deal with ... every quarter." 139 Taking such statements into account,
the court found that the company's president had "a particularized
awareness of the importance of timing in accounting for contract reve-
nues," which provided an unfortunate, but "valuable insight" into his
state of mind and the issue of intent to deceive. 1411
F. CONSIGNMENT TRANSACTIONS
Although consignment transactions often are legitimate, they are
sometimes used by a company as a fraudulent device to improperly rec-
ognize revenue. A consignment transaction may be generally described
as an arrangement in which the owner of the goods transfers possession,
but not title, to those goods to a third party for the purpose of effectuat-
ing sales of those goods to others. A company that recognizes revenue on
the consignment itself, as opposed to recognizing revenue upon any sub-
sequent sale of the goods, engages in an abusive revenue recognition
practice. In In re Polaroid Corporation Securities Litigation, the plaintiff
class alleged that Polaroid had recognized and reported revenue of at
least $16 million in revenues on consignment film sales to a Hong Kong
firm, which had no obligation to pay Polaroid until the firm had resold
the film to its customers.' 4' The consignment sales to this one firm, ac-
cording to plaintiffs, accounted for fifteen percent of Polaroid's actual
earnings for the quarter. 42 Courts consistently have found this kind of
improper revenue recognition to be sufficiently flagrant to constitute
fraud. 143
G. BILL AND HOLD SALES
The bill and hold sales device takes various forms, but may generally be
described as a manipulative technique in which the seller retains physical
possession of goods ordered by the customer until the customer requests
shipment to a designated location. Similar to the unshipped orders de-
vice, the company retains the risk and rewards of ownership, but never-




141. In re Polaroid Corp. Sec. Litig., 134 F. Supp. 2d 176, 187 (D. Mass. 2001).
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 626 (9th Cir. 1997) (overstating revenues
by reporting consignment transactions as sales is materially misleading); Malone v.
Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 1994) (reporting consignment transactions as sales




However, the bill and hold sales device differs because the company does
not act unilaterally by booking revenues on unshipped goods, but acts
bilaterally pursuant to bill and hold arrangements with various customers.
Frequently, the bill and hold arrangement does not involve the cus-
tomer's contractual commitments to purchase, but a conditional or con-
tingent contract dependent on the customer's acceptance criteria.
In In re Seriologicals Corp., for example, the company periodically sent
pre-purchase product samples to customers for testing, pursuant to a bill
and hold arrangement with its customer.' 44 If the customer failed to re-
ject the sample within six to ten weeks after receipt, the company would
automatically invoice the customer for an entire lot of unshipped product
and immediately recognize the revenue. The customer, however, re-
tained the right to reject product samples and to obtain refunds of any
payments if the samples did not meet its acceptance criteria. In addition,
the customer never made any fixed commitment to purchase any particu-
lar lot and never specified any fixed delivery schedule. The company
stored the lots at a leased warehouse until such time as the customer re-
quested shipment, and, if and when the customer made that request, the
company would ship the goods. 145 Revenue recognition under these cir-
cumstances is a highly deceptive practice. Although bill and hold ar-
rangements, particularly where risk of loss has passed to the buyer, may
not always be abusive, they generally should be viewed with suspicion. 146
H. SHIP AND STORE SALES
The ship and store abusive revenue recognition practice is a variant of
the bill and hold device. In order to meet or exceed projected revenue
goals, a company may induce customers to sign ship and store agreements
pursuant to which the company will ship its products to a storage facility
and immediately invoice the customer with the understanding that the
customer would not have to pay for the products until it requested ship-
ment and actually received the products. The company, by recognizing
revenue at the time of invoicing and before shipment, deceptively inflates
revenues, thereby distorting investor perceptions of the company's finan-
cial performance. For example, in In re Cylink Securities Litigation, the
plaintiffs alleged that Cylink, among other misconduct, recognized reve-
nue on a $1.3 million purchase order from Citibank which instructed
144. In re Seriologicals Corp., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No.
1551 (May 1, 2002).
145. Id.
146. See In re Stewart Parness, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No.
108 (Aug. 5, 1986). In its release, the SEC articulated the following "stringent accounting
criteria" applicable to bill and hold sales: (1) the buyer, not the seller, must request the bill
and hold arrangement; (2) the buyer must have a substantial business purpose for request-
ing the bill and hold transaction; and (3) the risks of ownership must have passed to the
buyer. Id. See generally In re Arthur Andersen & Co., S.E.C. Docket 1346 (June 22, 1991);
SEC v. Electro-Catheter Corp., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No.
196 (July 15, 1988): In re Cypress Bioscience, Inc., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Act Release No. 817 (Sept. 19, 1996).
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Cylink not to invoice the sale until Citibank designated the installation
site and Cylink actually shipped the ordered equipment.147 Cylink simply
shipped the equipment to a third party warehouse and recognized the
revenue. The court concluded that the allegations of Cylink's premature
revenue recognition provided strong circumstantial evidence that
Cylink's chief financial officer acted with deliberate recklessness. 148
I. INVENTORY PARKING
Inventory parking is a fraudulent scheme in which a company arranges
with its distributors to place bogus orders for company products that they
do not agree to buy in order to help the company meet its revenue goals.
The company then makes a bookkeeping entry, recording the amount of
the orders as revenue. In some instances, the product is actually shipped
to these purported customers followed by a preauthorized return of the
product in subsequent quarters. In Bell v. Fore Systems, Inc., it was al-
leged that the defendant company reported for one quarter almost $2
million in revenue on shipments of its products to one distributor and
during the subsequent three quarters virtually all of the products shipped
were returned to the company. 49 The company then issued credit
memos to the distributor reversing the revenue previously recorded on
these transactions. The company entered similar transactions with an-
other distributor, improperly recognizing almost $5 million in revenues
for products shipped during the last week of a quarter and then authoriz-
ing the return of virtually all of the products during the following two
quarters. 1511
J. BuY-BACK TRANSACTIONS
The buy-back transaction is another frequently used device to create
false revenues. In this frequently used arrangement, the seller recognizes
revenue on a contract after inducing a purported buyer to purchase the
seller's products by promising to repurchase the same products in a sub-
sequent reporting period. In Holmes v. Baker, the plaintiff class alleged
the company shipped aircraft engines to various cooperative companies
at the end of its quarters and immediately recognized revenues.' 5' These
buyers would hold the engines until after the end of the next quarter and
either return the engine for credit or would break down the engines and
resell the parts back to the company or its affiliates.' 52 This device per-
mitted the company to inflate its revenues through, essentially, wash
transactions, which had no economic substance.
147. In re Cylink Sec. Litig., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1081 (N.D. Fla. 2001).
148. Id. at 1082; see aso In re Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig., 299 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2002).
149. Bell v. Fore Sys., Inc., No. CIV.A. 97-1265, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7808, at *7-8
(W.D. Pa. May 25, 1999).
150. /d. at *8.
151. Holmes v. Baker, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2001).




Recognition of revenue based on contingent or conditional sales con-
tracts has been used by numerous companies to inflate their quarter-end
and year-end sales revenues. Like other abusive devices, this scheme has
many variations. Generally, it involves the company's recognition of rev-
enue on contracts that provide for eventual payment only upon the occur-
rence of various events not subject to its control. For example, the SEC
brought an action against officers of Legato Systems, Inc., for recognizing
millions of dollars in revenue on orders that were contingent on the cus-
tomers' ability to resell the products through to end users or contingent
on the customer's rights to return the products or to cancel the orders
altogether. 153 The company's vice president, during negotiations on an
order, drafted a side letter agreement providing cancellation rights, in
which he stated that "this contingency may not be expressly stated in the
order letter because of the impact on revenue recognition." 154 The SEC
concluded that "[t]he side agreements granted rights of return or other
terms that made the sales contingent, and, thus, made it improper for
Legato to recognize revenue on those transactions." 155
In the software industry, contingent contracts frequently involve the
use of value added resellers that buy products from a software company
for subsequent resale to end users. Payment for these products is often
expressly conditioned on the value added resellers' collections on sales to
their customers. 156 In another variant, payment for a company's products
may be made contingent on approval by a third party. In In re Ramp
Networks, Inc. Securities Litigation, the plaintiffs alleged that Ramp Net-
works improperly recognized and reported revenues on product sales to a
buyer that was to resell the products to Microsoft employees.1 5 7 Al-
though the buyer's payment obligation allegedly was conditioned on
Microsoft's testing, approval, and pricing of the products, Ramp Net-
works nevertheless recognized the revenues as if those conditions had
been satisfied. 158 Contingent contracts obviously leave the selling com-
pany with substantial economic risks and are clearly not eligible for reve-
nue recognition.
153. In Re Legato Sys., Inc. & Stephen Wise, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Act Release No. 1557 (May 20, 2002).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., DSAM Global Value Fund v. Altris Software, Inc., 288 F.3d 385 (9th Cir.
2002); Cheney v. Cyberguard Corp., No. 98-6879-CIV, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16351 (S.D.
Fla. July 31, 2000). See SOP 97-2, supra note 101, which provides, among other things, that
if a company's arrangement to deliver software does not require significant production,
modification or customization of the software, revenue should be recognized only when all
of the following criteria are satisfied: (1) persuasive evidence of an arrangement exists, (2)
delivery has occurred, (3) the seller's fee is fixed or determinable, and (4) revenue collec-
tibility is reasonably probable.
157. In re Ramp Networks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 201 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
158. Id. at 1069-70.
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L. RIGHT OF RETURN CONTRACTS
As this designation suggests, right of return or "take back" contracts
are contracts providing customers with a right to return products after
shipment and delivery. Companies frequently use these types of con-
tracts to induce customers to purchase their products, particularly in situ-
ations where a particular product is in its developmental stage or where
the customer is a middleman and positioned to demand a right of return
if unable to sell the product to end customers. A company that proceeds
to recognize revenue on these contracts despite the possibility of return
clearly transgresses applicable accounting principles. Unless the com-
pany has booked appropriate reserves for the reasonable likelihood of
returns, recording revenue on contracts subject to a right of return is bla-
tantly improper.15 9
M. TRY-BuY CONTRACTS
The try-buy contracts device involves a company's practice of recogniz-
ing revenues upon delivery of its products to customers on a trial basis. It
is a frequently used variant of right of return contracts, and only becomes
a mechanism for abuse when a company elects to prematurely recognize
revenues. Try-buy contracts are ineligible for such recognition because
these sales contracts are incomplete. For example, in In re Sensormatic
Electronics Corp. Securities Litigation, the plaintiff class alleged that the
company, instead of delaying recognition of revenue until final accept-
ance of its products and completion of the sales, artificially inflated reve-
nues by prematurely recognizing revenues from try-buy contracts. 160
These allegations, taken together with other alleged misleading disclo-
sures, were found sufficiently particularized to overcome the defendant's
motion to dismiss. 16'
N. INFLATED BARTER TRANSACTIONS
It is not uncommon for companies to exchange nonmonetary assets,
and these exchanges may result in appropriate recognition of revenues if
the valuations of the exchanged assets are reasonable. However, a com-
pany may act abusively by blatantly overvaluing the assets received while
undervaluing the assets transferred in order to recognize exaggerated rev-
159. See FAS 48, supra note 100; see also Aldridge v. A.T. Cross Corp., 284 F.3d 72, 81
(1st Cir. 2002) (dealing with allegations of improper revenue recognition on sales of Cross-
Pads subject to a take back guarantee); In re Telzon Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 5:98-CV-2876,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20192 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2000) (considering allegations of im-
proper revenue recognition for goods shipped subject to right of return); In re Scholastic
Corp. Sec. Litig., 252 F.3d 63, 73 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1071 (2001) (allega-
tions of improper revenue recognition on book shipments subject to right of return); SEC
v. Sys. Software Assoc., Inc., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 1285
(July 14, 2000) (regarding improper revenue recognition on shipment of dysfunctional
software).
160. In re Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., No. 01-8346-CIV, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10715, at
*9 (S.D. Fla. June 8, 2002).
161. Id. at *20.
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enues from the transaction. Under GAAP, in order to recognize revenue
from a barter transaction, a company must establish not only the fair
value of either the property it transferred or the property it received but
also that the ascribed value of the property received reasonably reflects
the company's expected actual use of the property.162 Exchanges be-
tween parties to a barter transaction of offsetting monetary considera-
tion, such as a swap of checks or promissory notes for roughly equal
amounts, cannot be used to evidence the fair value of the transaction. 163
Recently, the SEC charged Critical Path, Inc., an e-mail services com-
pany, with violations of the federal securities laws for its deceptive recog-
nition of over $3 million in revenues from an inflated barter transaction
with a third party. 164 In order to meet the company's profitability projec-
tions, it allegedly employed an inflated barter transaction without fairly
valuing the assets exchanged by both parties to the transaction. 165 The
SEC has frequently treated these transactions as transparent shams. 166
0. COOKIE JAR RESERVES
The use of so-called cookie jar reserves to time and inflate revenue
recognized by a company has become the subject of increasing scrutiny in
recent years by both the SEC and the plaintiffs' bar. A company, in or-
der to develop a resource for smoothing out or otherwise inflating reve-
nues in future reporting periods, may create inflated reserves for future
contingencies. If it significantly overreserves for those contingencies, a
company will have created a pool of potential revenues available to mask
future revenue shortfalls. It can produce these revenues at any time by
reducing the reserves. Perhaps the most abusive use of these cookie jar
reserves was reflected by the behavior of "Chainsaw Al" Dunlap and his
confederates at Sunbeam. 67
In order to reinforce his reputation as a corporate turnaround wizard,
Dunlap caused the creation of exaggerated reserves for unlikely contin-
gencies to provide a source of inflated revenues whenever necessary in
the future. By creating excessive reserves in the disastrous year when he
came to power, Dunlap positioned himself to inflate Sunbeam's income
in the successive year, enabling him to produce the false picture of a rapid
162. ACCOUNTING FOR NONMONETARY TRANSACIIONS, APB Opinion No. 29 (Ac-
counting Principles Bd. 1973).
163. ACCOUNTING FOR ADVERTISING BARTER TRANSACTIONS, Emerging Issues Task
Force No. 99-17, $ 4 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1999).
164. In re Critical Path, Inc., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No.
1503 (Feb. 5, 2002).
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., SEC v. Ickovics, S.E.C. Docket 1681 (Sept. 28, 1999).
167. See SEC v. Dunlap, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 1395
(May 15, 2001); In re David C. Fannin, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release
No. 1394 (May 15, 2001); In re Sunbeam Corp., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act
Release No. 1393 (May 15, 2001); see also SEC v. Dunlap, No. 01-8437-CIV, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10769 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2002); In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 176 F. Supp. 2d
1323 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
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turnaround in Sunbeam's financial performance. 16 As a result of his
abusive behavior at Sunbeam, Dunlap paid the largest fine ever assessed
against an individual in a financial fraud action, was forever barred from
serving as an officer or director of a publicly-held company, and was
forced to personally shell out $15 million to settle a related class action
for fraud. 169
The SEC is now vigorously prosecuting companies that it determines
are using cookie jar reserves to smooth out earnings. It recently settled
charges against Microsoft that the company had created unsubstantiated
reserves in order to manipulate future earnings reports. 170 The SEC
claimed that the company, during the three-year period from 1995 to
1998, had created numerous reserve accounts totaling $200 to $900 mil-
lion that did not have properly substantiated bases and documentary sup-
port. Fortunately for Microsoft, the SEC apparently did not have
sufficient evidence to prove that Microsoft's improper revenue recogni-
tion actually caused losses to investors, especially since the company
demonstrated offsetting understatements of revenue. Consequently, the
SEC did not require Microsoft to restate any financial results.' 7 1 Given
the recent emphasis the SEC has placed on the exploitation of reserves to
manage or otherwise manipulate revenue, corporate counsel should be
particularly wary of this revenue recognition device. 172
P. CHANNEL STUFFING
The term "channel stuffing" refers to a sales practice frequently em-
ployed by publicly-held companies to artificially increase revenues to
meet Wall Street expectations by inducing their distributors, typically
through price cuts, extended payment and delivery terms, and other in-
centives, to purchase more product than they would have purchased in
the normal course of business. Channel stuffing is often compounded by
the accompanying use of other deceptive revenue recognition devices, in-
cluding side agreements providing distributors or other customers with
generous rights of return, conditional payment obligations, or cancella-
tion rights. Although channel stuffing allows a manufacturing company
to meet financial targets in a given quarter and thus satisfy market expec-
168. See SEC v. Dunlap, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 1395
(May 15, 2001).
169. SEC v. Dunlap, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 1623
(Sept. 4, 2002); see also Floyd Norris, Former Sunbeam Chief Agrees to Ban and a Fine of
$500,000, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2002, at Cl.
170. In re Microsoft Corp., Auditing and Accounting Enforcement Act Release No.
1563 (June 3, 2002); see also SEC, Microsoft Settle Charges Company Skewed Earnings
Reports, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 945 (June 10, 2002).
171. In re Microsoft Corp., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No.
1563 (June 3, 2002).
172. See, e.g., SEC v. Xerox, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No.
1542 (Apr. 11, 2002); James Bandler & Mark Maremont, Harsh Spotlight: Accountant's
Work with Xerox Sets New Test for SEC, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2002, at Al; see also SEC v.
Guenther, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 1489 (Jan. 8, 2002); P.
Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Cendant Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 589 (D.N.J. 2001).
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tations, it generally leads to reduced revenues in succeeding periods be-
cause distributors would then have a greater supply of inventory than
needed to satisfy their own customers' requirements in the ordinary
course of business.
Some indications or red flags suggesting that channel stuffing may have
occurred include large quarter-end sales, significant increases in accounts
receivables, special late quarter discounts, extended payment terms, and
distributors' receipt of large, one-time shipments in excess of current in-
ventory requirements. While channel stuffing may not be inherently
fraudulent, companies employing this device have duties to disclose both
its use and the material impact it will likely have on future revenues. 173
Companies rarely, if ever, confess their use of this practice, and its use
generally contradicts their public disclosures regarding both their distri-
bution and revenue recognition policies, as well as previously announced
business trends. 7 4 Consequently, companies engaged in undisclosed
channel stuffing fraudulently distort investor perceptions and artificially
inflate the market value of their securities.
The deceptive revenue recognition devices identified above are those
that have been the most frequently exposed in recent years by SEC inves-
tigations and private securities fraud litigation. Variants of these devices
and a host of more creatively fraudulent schemes have been and continue
to be exploited to inflate corporate revenues in order to deceive investors
and the marketplace. However, the ones I have described should be suf-
ficient to alert the corporate bar that these frauds are being used with
impunity, that they involve deception that has little to do with mathemat-
ical questions or accounting complexities, and that perhaps no profession
is any better equipped than corporate counsel to identify these deceptive
practices and report evidence of their use to their corporate clients' high-
est authorities. This is their federal mandate under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and
under their evolving standards of care.
Corporate counsel obviously must be familiar with each of the com-
monly used fraudulent revenue recognition schemes if they are to protect
the interest of their publicly-held organizational clients. These practices,
even apart from their actual impact on reported financial results, may
constitute manipulative devices prohibited by federal securities laws.
Clearly, corporate counsel must possess a fundamental understanding of
their clients' businesses and general familiarity with these abusive prac-
tices. However, they must become better positioned to detect the actual
173. For examples of alleged channel stuffing, see In re Trex Co., Inc. Sec. Litig., 212 F.
Supp. 2d 596 (W.D. Va. 2002), Harvey M. Jasper Ret. Trust v. Ivax Corp., 920 F. Supp. 1260
(S.D. Fl. 1995), and In re Compaq Sec. Litig., 848 F. Supp. 1307 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
174. Management's discussion and analysis "shall provide information ... with respect
to liquidity, capital resources and results of operations," including "any known trends or
... uncertainties" that are reasonably believed to "have a material favorable or unfavora-




use of these devices. They should undertake independent, random in-
quiries of their clients' personnel engaged in sales, marketing, and distri-
bution of the clients' goods and services, as well as inquiries of their
clients' distributors and other major customers. They should also review
contractual arrangements and documentation used by their clients in ef-
fecting sales to customers, and, especially, all revenue producing agree-
ments with their clients' affiliates. In making these inquiries, corporate
counsel should be particularly vigilant regarding late quarter revenue
generation. They must recognize that corporate personnel are subject to
mounting pressures to achieve projected results during the final weeks of
reporting periods, and, hence, more likely to succumb to fraudulent tech-
niques. This is not to suggest that counsel engage in full-blown due dili-
gence for all periodic reports, press releases, and other public disclosures.
For counsel to be effective professional participants in their corporate
clients' disclosure processes, they must engage in a modified, or short-
form, due diligence investigation to protect their clients and their clients'
shareholder owners from internally generated financial fraud.' 75 In im-
plementing this recommended short-form due diligence, corporate coun-
sel will develop the parameters of their clients' random due diligence and
thereby set their own standards as professionals representing publicly-
held corporations. Should corporate counsel fail to recognize their en-
hanced responsibilities in the detection, abatement, and disclosure of fi-
nancial fraud, they and their firms may reap the whirlwind suffered by
Arthur Andersen.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have noted that corporate counsel, working in an envi-
ronment of systemic financial fraud, have lost whatever comfort they
have enjoyed in treating accounting standards as off-limits to their world
of legal principles. I have discussed their evolving duty of competence,
and the critical link between the materiality doctrine and elemental ac-
counting principles, particularly those addressing the proper recognition
of corporate revenues. The legal and accounting professions have not
understood the critical differences in their respective definitions of mate-
riality and their respective perceptions of their roles in ensuring full dis-
175. In the Report of the SEC Advisory Committee on Capital Formation and Regula-
tory Processes, it was noted that a significant portion of publicly-held companies reporting
under the 1934 Act did not access public markets and, consequently, are never subjected to
the due diligence investigations contemplated by the 1933 Act. See S.E.C. Release No. 33-
7314, S.E.C. Docket 1046 (July 25, 1996). The committee concluded that because the sec-
ondary or trading markets dwarf the primary markets for these companies' securities, the
present disclosure system disserves the investing public by imposing higher disclosure stan-
dards on episodic public offerings than on the periodic reports filed by publicly-held com-
panies. Id. It specifically recommended that these companies establish a "disclosure
committee" of outside directors to investigate periodic disclosures on a continuous basis.
Id. While I concur fully with this recommendation, I believe corporate counsel, in fulfilling




closure to investors in the prose and the numbers that publicly-held
companies must disseminate. In my discussion of the materiality doc-
trine, I have emphasized that quality rules quantity and have synthesized
from materiality law and practice four vitally important materiality pre-
sumptions corporate counsel should apply in making materiality assess-
ments. I have then described the GAAP that should be applied before
publicly-held companies recognize and report revenues. In doing so, I
have intended not only to demystify those principles but also to expose
for corporate counsel the essentially legal, contractual nature of many of
the applicable criteria. Last, I have briefly described the more commonly
used deceptive revenue recognition practices.
While my coverage of these abusive practices has not been exhaustive
in any sense, I have set forth their primary elements to demonstrate that
these practices, all variants "on a limited catalog of established
themes,"'176 are each fraudulent and manipulative devices corporate
counsel must recognize in order to ensure their clients' compliance with
federal disclosure laws. In Congress's opinion, as expressed in the politi-
cally reactive Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, corporate counsel's failure to
do so has forfeited their traditional privilege to regulate their own behav-
ior in providing professional services to publicly-held corporate clients.
The SEC will soon promulgate standards of professional conduct for
corporate counsel pursuant to its Congressional mandate. The SEC will
require that corporate counsel honor the corporate client-not the corpo-
rate officers that retain them on the corporation's behalf-by assuming
duties to report any evidence of fraud or its kindred breaches of fiduciary
duties to the highest corporate authorities. To fulfill those new duties,
corporate counsel must develop sufficient competence to recognize the
more common deceptive recognition practices used in the past and the
red flags that suggest their recurrence. This could have been done before,
but for too long they have wrongfully assumed that accountants, through
their auditing processes, would somehow resolve legal materiality issues
regarding the financial results of their publicly-held clients and would
somehow insist that those clients make the required disclosures under
federal securities laws.
Now, faced with federal preemption of their standards of care, corpo-
rate lawyers must reassume their responsibilities to ensure compliance
with those laws. They also must reassess their competence as profession-
als. As lawyers charged with responsibility for materiality assessments
and compliance with complex federal securities legislation and SEC regu-
lations, they must have a fundamental understanding of their clients' bus-
iness operations and how those clients should properly measure and
report their economic performance. They should also develop and imple-
ment short-form, random due diligence practices to ensure that their cli-
ents' periodic financial disclosures are not the product of manipulative
176. Richard C. Sauer, Financial Statement Fraud: The Boundaries of Liability Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 57 Bus. LAW. 955, 957 (2002).
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devices engineered by their clients' management. Corporate counsel ob-
viously can no longer defer to the accounting profession. Although they
hardly have to become accountants, attorneys can easily understand the
general standards applicable to measurements of their clients' financial
position. In elevating their competence, corporate lawyers will better
serve the interest of their corporate clients. They may also be able to
regain their role as objective professionals, setting higher standards for
themselves than crisis-driven political representatives ever could.
Editors' Note: After Professor Warren's article was submitted for pub-
lication, the SEC issued Exchange Act Release No. 34-46868 (Nov. 21,
2002) proposing a fairly comprehensive rule of professional conduct for
attorneys in implementation of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002. Under the proposed rule, both outside and in-house counsel for
publicly-held reporting companies would be required, among other
things, to make "up the ladder" reports of material evidence of breaches
of securities laws and fiduciary duties to the chief legal counsel, audit
committee, board of directors, or, alternatively, a "qualified legal compli-
ance committee." Upon failing to obtain an appropriate response, coun-
sel would be required to make a "noisy withdrawal," reporting the
evidence of misconduct to the SEC.
After reviewing extensive comments, the SEC adopted its final rule, 17
C.F.R. § 205, but excepted out its noisy withdrawal proposal for further
comments. See SEC Adopts Attorney Conduct Rule Under Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, S.E.C. NEws DIG., Jan. 24, 2003. As an alternative to noisy
withdrawal, the SEC proposed that the issuer be required to publicly dis-
close counsel's withdrawal in its Form 8-K within two days after notice of
the withdrawal. Should the issuer fail to disclose the withdrawal, counsel
would be permitted to inform the SEC. Id. It is significant that the final
rule, in defining "evidence of a material violation," establishes an objec-
tive standard, triggering up the ladder reports where counsel has credible
evidence that would make it "unreasonable, under the circumstances, for
a prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably
likely that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing or is about to
occur." Id. In order "to provide issuers, attorneys and law firms suffi-
cient time to put in place procedures to comply with its requirements,"
the final rule will not become effective until 180 days after its publication
in the Federal Register. Id.
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